Application of the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) on fires onboard ship by Ράμμος, Αλέξανδρος & Rammos, Alexandros
  
Author: Alexandros K. Rammos 
 
APPLICATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL 
RESONANSE ANALYSIS METHOD 
(FRAM) ON FIRES ONBOARD SHIP 
 
Thesis for the Engineering Diploma 
Athens, September 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS 
SCHOOL OF NAVAL ARCHITECTURE AND MARINE ENGINEERING 
LABORATORY FOR MARITIME TRANSPORT 
  
 Page | 2  
 
0. Prologue 
 
This paper is inspired by several months of research in safety management and incident 
investigation.  The author’s involvement in training courses on emergency response and damage 
control onboard ships and the related scientific research on these topics settled the foundation of 
knowledge for this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to 
attribute all events, to the causes immediate, 
and Instrumental: For these are all the 
causes they perceive. 
Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan, Chapter XI (15881679) 
 
 
 
 
 
I would like to thank all the experts that provided the help I needed, anytime I did, as well as all 
the people that inspired me to focus on the subject of safety. I also want to thank all those who 
supported me during this time. 
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1. Introduction 
Incidents challenge the current strategies incorporated in safety management in a way 
that they provide positive feedback for further improvement. It is a fact that safety –in the sense 
of lack of incidents, which is a topic that will be discussed further in this study - has improved in 
recent years. Newer legislation, technology and rules have significantly contributed to the 
reduced number of incidents. Yet, incidents still happen, and the investigations usually focus on 
design failures, faulty installations, poor maintenance, human negligence and wrong procedures.  
This suggests that the aforementioned factors are not always adequate for a complete model of 
safety. 
Through the first ages of safety, where technologic failures were the commonly thought 
reason for incidents, to the ages of blaming human factors or -later- organizational errors, and 
through models that either improve specific responses or strengthen the barriers, the question 
remains unanswered. The work-as-imagined and work-as-done gap and the variability in several 
needed actions turn the focus on system component interactions to create a more resilient system, 
designed to anticipate external hazards. 
This paper is motivated by the increasing number of practitioners and scholars with an 
interest in modeled resilience approaches to incident investigation and the presumed upon 
lessons-learned that come by those incidents.  
The potential of the Functional Resonance Assessment Method (also referred to as: the 
FRAM) to provide a deep investigation in the dynamics of an incident, to redeem lessons-learned 
in a more efficient and out-of-the-box path and to evaluate both the obtained lessons and the 
tool’s ability to evaluate resilience characteristics is explored. In brief, this method is selected 
because it dares to accept that the design process requires certain ignorance regarding the 
external hazards the system may be subject to, a pool of hazards that the designer cannot be 
expected to foresee.  That is also true for other factors as well, as the human element and even 
the behavior of technical equipment vary through time, age, load etc. 
This thesis studies a relatively new method to investigate incidents and create a 
Functional Resonance Analysis Method model of the system that failed. This model may 
highlight nodes that were subject to failure and that would otherwise be neglected, resulting in 
the reoccurrence of an incident. With the combined help from damage control experts’ 
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suggestions are made for the improvement of the system.  For the process of identifying the 
needed functions, a common framework is needed as a part of future research. This research 
required a thorough review in current literature and various data from incident investigations 
where the support by fire training experts that were consulted was crucial. 
This thesis researches the potential of the Functional Resonance Analysis Method to 
provide deeper understanding on fire incidents onboard ships as well as proactive and reactive 
control for such occurrences, with a focus on emergency response. At first, the effective use of 
the Functional Resonance Analysis Method for fire incident investigation from a systemic 
perspective is explored. Later, the feasibility of incorporating the Functional Resonance Analysis 
Method to provide suggestions for improvement is attempted and evaluated. Through the 
research, the method’s ability to obtain lessons via investigating is dominant. 
While the common practice instructs the elimination of the hazards that caused any given 
incidents, the analysis from a systemic perspective supports the resilient operation of the system. 
In addition to attempting to reduce the number of occurrences, the system should become more 
responsive to those inevitable disturbances. 
The focus of the research is to utilize the Functional Resonance Analysis Method to be 
applied in emergency response on fire incident on board ship. The procedure in such events is 
not as deterministic as other routine operations and hence, the analyses of the functions derive 
from the official investigation report, as this real-life scenario is the most realistic system 
response available. 
To achieve this, an instantiation for each of two selected incidents (the incident in 
Commodore Clipper, chapter 5.1 of this study and the incident of Edinburgh Castle, chapter 5.2 
of this study) was analyzed. This required extensive review of the available data of the event and 
each one is narrated with emphasis given on the ones that will be further analyzed. 
Due to the fact that the tool currently lacks quantitative calculations, the suggestions are 
provided solely by studying the interactions between functions, where FRAM excels. Additional 
suggestions for further research in combinations with the innovative fields of Machine Learning 
and Big Data analysis are given in the last chapter.   
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2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. Safety 
2.1.1. Safety-I and Safety-II  
The traditional view of safety requires an incident to happen in order to analyze and collect 
feedback for future occurrences of a similar event. The feedback is the focus of the safety 
research to make suggestions for a more efficient system. This view is called safety I since the 
addition of more modern schools of thought in safety research. The alternative view, called 
safety II accepts that ‘things go wrong’ for the same foundational reasons they “go right”. With 
respect to resilience engineering (discussed in more detail later in this chapter) this safety model 
analyses how the positive outcomes from everyday work are successful through varying external 
and internal factors. (Hollnagel, 2004) 
In general, technological systems are reliable (Hollnagel, 2004). Thus, safety investigates the 
root causes in unreliable factors of the system, i.e. humans and their performance. This 
approach’s focus on cause-effect relationships restricts the available data pool since incidents 
and near-misses occur far less than the everyday tasks that are successful. Thus, does not take 
into account the inevitable variations that are needed in real life operations.  
When a system is designed, each component is expected to work as designed and as 
instructed by external factors as authorities and regulations. However, in real life conditions the 
designed procedures frequently have high variations from the expected outcome. This work-as-
imagined and work-as-done gap, with the latter meaning what actually happens, is responsible 
for faulty predictions on real life situations. Safety-I suggests that failure is rooted in 
malfunctioning of a system component while Safety II attempts to adapt to those inevitable 
variations and adjust according to the current conditions in any procedure. These everyday 
variations are the causes of both the positive and negative outcomes. 
A large number of incidents are preventable with relative ease in hindsight, but the solutions 
are usually highly customized on very similar future occurrences. This poses a limitation to their 
change inspiring potential, as simple fixes or rushed decisions may not always apply on any 
system. 
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2.1.2. From Safety to Resilience 
Human error is widely considered to be the cause of different malfunctions, namely in 
organizational context. That means that the behavior of an operator is not solely based on his 
individual decisions, but also in other factors. The safety assessment methods need to study the 
effects of the functional couplings that are created between the organizations and the personnel 
operating the system. This incorporation of the relations between the different components of a 
system can significantly attribute to the exploration of the underlying causes. 
The analysis of the Roll on/Roll off Herald of Free Enterprise incident became a pioneering-
work enhancing the responsibilities of the shipping companies (IMO, 2010). This was the 
incident that made the need of more holistic assessment methods, able to identify the causes and 
prevent future incidents in a way that methods to that day were not as efficient.  
Through the ages of safety, the focus tends from negative to all the outcomes. Safety research 
used to rely on reducing the number of adverse effects by eliminating all malfunctions and even 
all failures as far as possible. As our experience in safety management increases, the system and 
procedure design increases in ability to respond when something happens and be able to succeed 
under varying conditions. Thus, the goal is shifting to increased resilience, with a system able to 
respond to uncertain adverse effects. 
The idea that safety is emerging from the varying interactions between the system 
components is expressed by Robertson et al. (2015), Vinerbi et al.(2010) and Mitropoulos and 
Cupido (2009) and others. 
Hollnagel et al. (2007), Carayon et al. (2015) study safety through the interactions across 
components, as an emergent property of sociotechnical systems. The components may be 
organizations, human behavior software and any other system interacting. The use of the term 
emergence was by Lewes 1874, describing how to express a system as a resultant of the 
components’ outcomes, where those outcomes are of different nature from each other. 
2.1.3. Resilience 
Resilience is the ability to recover and adjust easily to change. It is, by other words, the 
ability to absorb a disturbance and then return to the original condition unchanged. The term also 
refers to the ability to learn from these occurrences and be better prepared in future disturbances. 
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The principle is not to avoid disturbances but to be able to absorb them and obtain lessons. A 
more resilient system is capable of absorbing greater disturbances and then return to usual 
condition and function as effectively. 
Other definitions of resilience describe it as the ability to address and properly respond to 
regular as well as irregular disturbances, to know what to look for and be able to monitor 
anything that may become a threat in the near future. Being able to anticipate the potential 
hazards creates a proactively safe work environment. 
This approach offers room for further improvement in terms of safety and efficiency, 
combining human benefits with commercial benefits, by overcoming the existing limitations. 
Such benefits may further increase the interest in resilience. 
Safety in recent years is increasingly becoming a matter of managing performance. The 
variations in performance are necessary for proper functioning and inevitable. Thus, it must take 
into account the changes a system component’s performance may be subject to. The aim is to 
create a system that is able to adjust primary functions in case of a disturbance and then be able 
to work as before. As a property, a system’s resilience is difficult to be measured accurately.  
Five Key resilience Characteristics are described in the table below (Table 1) (Woods 2006). 
Buffering capacity The quality and magnitude of disruptions the system can adapt without a 
critical breakdown in performance. 
Flexibility versus 
stiffness 
The ability to restructure in response to disturbances and changes 
Margin How closely the system is operating relative to some kind of performance 
boundary 
Tolerance How a system behaves near a boundary, the severity of the collapse or the 
dampening effect 
Table 1 Key resilience Characteristics 
Cross-scale interactions are critical as the resilience of a system defined at one scale depends on 
influences from scales above and bellow  
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2.2. Incidents Onboard Ship 
It is my sincere wish — and hope — that the day will come in the not far distant future — when 
the protecting arms of Universal Safety will spread out over all industry and reach directly the 
millions of workers who make industry possible.  
Charles M. Schwab, "New Values in Industry," 1929 
Our investigation focuses on fire incidents onboard ships, as one of the most dangerous 
emergencies onboard. The same principles may be applicable to different kinds of incidents but 
those are out of the reach of this thesis. 
2.2.1. Incidents in the Maritime Environment 
 Ship operation and maintenance create a hazardous environment for crew members 
making it difficult to deal with the multitude of incidents that can occur by both the everyday 
routine operations of the crew and the machinery as well as the external random events such as 
extreme weather conditions. One of the greatest dangers for the ship is the fire outbreak, since 
even the smallest occurrence can lead to catastrophic results, with the crew unable to control the 
fire in open seas. There are many protocols established to tackle this issue and make fire 
detection and extinguish a viable goal, however, most of the measures aim to mitigate the 
damage until external help arrives. Hence, the most effective way to deal with fires on board 
ships is to prevent them in the first place, instead of trying to fight them, when it is possible (15 
May 2015, www.sipownersclub.com,  Fire prevention on board ships). That being said, ignition 
(fire break out where no fire exists) and flash (fire eruption in new place because of pre-existing 
fire in a near compartment) are the events that must be proactively managed by the crew.  
2.2.2. Incident Investigation 
Incident investigations combine elements of different fields of science as well as what we 
might characterize detective work.  Analyzing samples, testing materials in the laboratory, 
failure modes, all are scientific processes that provide the necessary data for the investigation.  
The reason of the failure is chosen by the investigator among different reasons such as fatigue 
failure or improper maintenance and neglect. This valuable process: 
• Discovers the hazards that led to the incident to prevent their recurrence. 
• Discovers additional hazards in the course of the investigation 
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This process requires complex analysis since no incident is caused by a single hazard or 
factor but by the combination of multiple failures and their interaction in the given moment. 
Incident investigations are conducted for both legal (claims, insurance, compensation, 
lawsuits) and safety (prevention of future incidents and their associated physical, emotional and 
material costs) reasons. However, even for different purposes, for both reasons the primary 
outcome is the prevention –or even reduction- of future incidents. It is important to note that the 
outcome is more reliable in safety investigations when the blaming is out of perception.  
The process of incident investigations is the same for both major incidents and lesser ones. 
Even though more focus is given on major incidents the lessons-learned obtained by the 
investigation may be of equal value.  Even near-misses, unplanned events that did not cause but 
had the potential to cause an incident, are of intrinsic value as a glimpse over the edge of the 
system’s capabilities.  
The common issue with incident investigation is the “you find what you look for” principle, 
meaning that the assumptions first made about the causes of the incident usually guide the 
analysis and often neglecting major weaknesses that remain hidden. 
2.2.3. Fire Onboard 
Fire onboard is one of the most serious risks for both the crew and the property. On board 
ship there are tons of stores of flammable material, liquid fuel, air-conditioning plants, engines, 
electrical equipment, boilers, and accommodation (kitchens, mess rooms, lounges, cabins, WCs). 
Then we must add the cargo which usually consists of at least partly flammable material or even 
dangerous chemicals. In the case of passenger ships, the same holds true for cars and increased 
accommodation as well as passengers unfamiliar with the hazards. Since the ship is, by its 
nature, all of its life cycle on sea, the effects of fire onboard can be devastating when combined 
with external hazards such as extreme weather conditions or simply the inability to get additional 
help from ashore. Thus, fire onboard frequently results in loss of life, precious cargo or 
environmental damage-since the vessel may be inoperable. When the wrong rescue methods are 
employed, for example the indiscriminate use of large quantities of water, the ship may be lost as 
a result of instability, and not because of the fire. Garri G. (1992) 
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2.2.4. Safety Guidelines 
Regulation 2 of chapter II-2 of SOLAS sets up fire safety objectives to prioritize and 
emphasize the key points of interest in regards to fire safety. 
1. Prevent the occurrence of fire and explosion 
2. Reduce the risk to life caused by fire 
3. Reduce the risk of damage cause by fire to the ship, its cargo and the environment 
4. Contain, control, and suppress fire and explosion in the compartment of origin 
5. Provide adequate and readily accessible means of escape for passengers and crew. 
2.2.5. Functional Requirements 
Proactive safety guidelines (SOLAS, regulation 2 of chapter II-2, for this matter) regulate a 
number of requirements in ship construction and operation to prevent and reduce risk of life and 
material damage. 
1. Division of the ship into main vertical and horizontal zones by thermal and structural 
boundaries 
2. Separation of accommodation spaces from the remainder of the ship by thermal and 
structural boundaries 
3. Restricted use of combustible materials 
4. Detection of any fire in the zone of origin 
5. Containment and extinction of any fire in the space of origin 
6. Protection of means of escape and access for fire fighting 
7. Ready availability of fire-extinguishing appliances  
8. Minimization of possibility of ignition of flammable cargo vapor. 
 
2.3. Emergency Response 
In the maritime industry, the emergency response refers to the system’s response to situations 
that may cause serious damage or sinking of the vessel. Such hazards are for example fire 
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onboard and flooding (either due to rupture, hatches left open, excess firefighting use of water 
etc.). The term “Emergency Response” is found on warships as “Damage Control” and in this 
thesis; the two terms are used interchangeably.  
Each of these damage control scenarios require a unique damage control method utilizing all 
the vessel’s defenses, be it active equipment or crew and squads. The crew must be properly 
trained since usually, immediate rescue from ashore is not an option. The purpose is to maintain 
the seakeeping until external help arrives or the vessel is safe at dock. The procedures followed 
during damage control are detailed to ensure effectiveness in order. However, it is important to 
note that order, is particularly hard to keep during these emergency situations when the whole 
system is under extreme load. 
2.3.1. Evacuation 
In response to fire or flooding, evacuation procedures have two main phases: 1) mustering 
and 2) abandonment. Mustering refers to the relocation of the crowd in a safer position on board 
the ship and the procedure is initiated by a unique alarm, calling the passengers to summon in a 
muster station. Abandonment refers to the embarkation and launching of the lifeboats. 
Nevertheless, search and rescue should be considered too.  
The most safety-critical asset during this procedure is time. Evacuating a large passenger-
ship involves moving thousands of people safely between different parts of the vessel. Such a 
process is highly demanding on the vessel’s resources, as crew-personnel and decision-making. 
The latter becomes increasingly complex when the evolving and dynamic nature of the crisis is 
considered. Given the limitations of human functions, assuming that the passengers will behave 
as expected and follow instructions is not advised.  
IMO SOLAS Chapter II-2, Part D, Regulation 13 – ‘Means of Escape’, as it was amended 
under Resolution MSC.404(96) makes evacuation analysis a mandatory requirement for new 
passenger ships constructed (keel lay date) on or after 1st January 2020, when carrying more 
than 36 passengers. It recommends the use of MSC1/Circ. 1533 [2], which provides the Revised 
Guidelines on evacuation analyses for new and existing passenger ships. These guidelines offer a 
simplified and an advanced method for conducting the evacuation analysis. The input for the 
simplified method was based on measurements of people movement in land buildings which 
share physical similarities (dimensions, reproducible light conditions) with ship evacuation. 
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Unfortunately, the operational requirements of passenger ship evacuation are not equivalent to 
those of buildings on land – e.g. the behavior of the people involved - which has led to many 
experts criticizing the current guidelines. In addition, extreme conditions, fire and flooding 
hazards render the current regulatory instruments insufficient. 
The required evacuation procedures on-board ships are far more complex to a building where 
the only requirement is to find and navigate to the nearest exit points. Passengers are instructed 
to return to their cabins to collect lifejackets before heading for a pre-defined assembly (or 
muster) station. They must then exit the ship by getting to lifeboats, life raft and possibly 
evacuation slides, for which they have no training and in some cases are very reluctant due to 
arrangement of equipment (e.g. use of chute), physical limitations or even personal ones (e.g. 
elderly or claustrophobic people). The ship is floating on waves and this may result in significant 
motions and accelerations. Furthermore, in case of flooding, it may list or even capsize rapidly. 
2.4. The Human Element 
Human performance, either for individuals or for small groups of people, is considered to be 
highly variable. There are many factors that can hinder human performance but more importantly 
the same factors result in unexpected variations in everyday work. The role of the human 
element on fire incidents onboard ships is described in the following paragraphs. 
2.4.1.  Human Factors Triggering Human Error 
Human factors affecting safety can be divided into organizational, group and individual 
factors. Some examples of organizational factors are management commitment to safety, safety 
training, open communication, environmental control and management, stable workforce, and 
positive safety promotion policy. Examples of group factors are line-management style, good 
supervision and clear understanding of own and other team members’ roles and responsibilities. 
Individual factors are related to factors which affect a person’s performance such as human-
machine interface and competence, stress, motivation and workload of an individual. (Gorgon, 
R. P. E, 1998)  
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2.4.2. Crew Performance Variability in Fire Incidents 
Fire is the most common and dangerous emergency on board ship and have already 
caused disastrous results in regard to life loss. Fire Safety systems fail unexpectedly. Engineering 
make steps and even leaps in the safety zone but still, fire incidents remain quite common.  
Thus, the most important aspect of fire prevention is the crew itself. 
And crew performance is the most difficult to predict aspect of our investigation. In brief: 
• The crew must be trained thoroughly and regularly (as recently regulated by IMO with 
the mandatory update of the STCW training every five years (International Shipping 
Federation (2011)) 
• The training should include use of simulators to replicate the conditions of an actual 
emergency since it is common knowledge that humans behave differently in cases of life-
threatening events 
• Even after successful training, crew members have to deal with a number of factors that 
affect human behavior and performance such as sleep deprivation and irregular sleep 
patterns, motion sickness and even boredom on board. 
• Other human factors like fatigue and stress on top of other duties onboard (since there are 
no dedicated firefighters onboard)  
All these factors should be considered as well since a large number of incidents are at least partly 
due to these human limitations.  
2.4.3. Human Element Performance with regards to incident stage 
Data from incident investigations result in three major phases that human interference can 
affect the voyage. Hence, there are three general categories that the human factor can negatively 
affect the safety of the vessel. These are the result of the safety protocols not properly followed, 
for whatever reason. 
Fire initiation 
As seen in the collective data, crew members (and also passengers) constitute a serious 
fire hazard onboard ship. From cigarette flames to inattention in the kitchen, human negligence 
to rules and regulations designed to prevent such events can initiate a small but potentially 
catastrophic fire. 
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Late detection 
Perhaps the most common negative effects the human factor can have on board is caused 
by negligence, either willingly or unintentionally. Conditions on board, continuous false positive 
alarms, stress and fatigue make everyday tasks greatly harder and often distract crew members. 
Thus, events like alarm bypasses become common as do rushed checking and not paying 
attention during scheduled and unscheduled patrols.  
As noted before, the crews’ and the vessel’s best chance of survival is fire prevention and 
early detection to take action. If the fire spreads, the chances of survival drop significantly. 
Failure to mitigate damage 
A common fire cause is the ignition of pressured sprayed oil in hot surfaces of the engine 
room. This is a risk that cannot be mitigated by human factor optimization. However, even in an 
event of an already developed fire, the firefighting code provides with methods to mitigate the 
damage through standardized procedures and protocols. As noted in the aforementioned 
investigations, a fatigued crew that may have not had the proper training in realistic environment 
and in realistic conditions may find the event extremely stressful, significantly interfering with 
the performance with potentially catastrophic results. (Ventikos N., Lykos G., Rammos A., 
Petropoulos V., 2018) 
2.5. What Skills can be observed 
2.5.1. Human limitation- Stress and Fatigue 
Stress has been identified as a contributory factor to the productivity and health costs of an 
organization as well as to personnel’s health and welfare (Matsidi Vasiliki, Papaleonida 
Paraskevi, 2014). Stress arises in highly demanding tasks as a bodily response to the fight-or-
flight dilemma. It is important to note that high stress levels impair human performance making 
individuals more susceptible to errors. If those effects are chronic then the implications on the 
individual’s health are heavily taxing and this fact should not be ignored. When the human 
limitations are exceeded the stress response is high and if not properly managed it can 
significantly affect one’s performance and behavior. The acute effects of a high stress response 
range from impaired decision making and faulty situational awareness to reduced physical 
capabilities and decreased performance. High baseline stress levels also induce absent-mindness, 
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increasing the chances of errors in everyday routine tasks. The mitigating methods include 
proper and realistic training that change the perspective of the individual, making the task seem 
closer to his capabilities than if were untrained. 
The demanding conditions of work in the maritime industry, resulting from e.g. more hours 
on duty and short passages, create an exhaustive environment leading to decreased crew’s 
performance. This can increase the number of errors occurred by human mistake (Matsidi 
Vasiliki, Papaleonida Paraskevi, 2014). Studies that focus on questionnaire analysis have found 
that 17% of watch officers have fallen asleep and 40% have been near nodding off on watch 
(Matsidi Vasiliki, Papaleonida Paraskevi, 2014). The causal factors of fatigue that lead to 
decreased performance are summarized in the table below: 
Table 2 Factors that lead to decreased performance 
Workload Harder work in larger volume requires additional time for recovery 
Sleep dept. The absence of sleep makes the crew more fatigued and decreases their 
attention 
Perceived risk or 
interest 
A demanding task may keep the crew alert, but the accumulative fatigue 
increases the need for recovery. Boring tasks may increase fatigue too. 
Time of the day While the vessel needs the same constant level of attention, human 
performance varies during daytime and nighttime. 
Environment The ship’s environment is demanding and tiring and the decreased 
quality of rest increases fatigue accumulation.[6 human error]. 
 
Communication difficulties decreased attention and vigilance, mood changes, omissions 
and carelessness, inability to concentrate and faulty memory are common signs of accumulated 
fatigue. (Matsidi Vasiliki, Papaleonida Paraskevi, 2014) 
2.4.2. Non-Technical Skills 
Situational Awareness refers to the perception of the events and the elements in the 
surrounding environment and one’s ability to understand their meaning even after a variable 
changes. In other words, it is to be aware of the impact one’s actions make in any given situation. 
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It is a very important aspect in emergency responses since the hazardous environment of these 
situations change the surrounding environment rapidly, making it difficult for non-stressed 
decision making. 
Communication and Teamwork are another important non-technical skill. Unlike 
technological systems where the communication is via predesigned pathways, humans often find 
it difficult to communicate with each other, especially under a stressful situation, as is an 
emergency response. Even if certified and agreed in the use of a common language, emergency 
responses lead to the use of the native language. This is often the case during life-threatening 
situations. Reduced communication results in decreased efficiency as a team since teamwork is 
impaired. 
2.4.3. Organization Failure 
There are three main causes for organizational failure: 
Insufficient Training and Inadequate Manning: Any organization is responsible for the 
training of their crew members. Through this repeated training the crew gains valuable technical 
and non-technical skills, useful in any situation. Crew members are responsible for a number of 
tasks on board and that includes damage control. Hence, they are trained in simulated 
environments such as Fire simulators that create a realistic environment for them to train and test 
their abilities and skills. If this important part is ignored, procedures are not followed correctly 
and that has many implications on other aspects of the system, as this study tries to expose.  
Inadequate manning also poses a safety risk since the quantity of tasks may rapidly increase in an 
emergency scenario. 
Safety Culture: A philosophy promoting safety as the ultimate consideration for all 
company personnel and applied to all activities undertaken both ashore and at sea 
Working Environment: Environment can affect crew performance both directly and 
indirectly. The marine environment has crew members face currents, winds, fog and extreme 
weather conditions to name a few. Proper work schedules and design feature can help improve 
the working environment. 
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3. Methodology 
 
There are numerous analysis methods for complex systems available that also provide visual 
presentation and analysis techniques. Among these methods are Cognitive Work Analysis 
(Vicente, 1999), AcciMap (Svedung & Rasmussen, 2002), system dynamics (e.g. Senge, 1990), 
and various enterprise architecture frameworks (e.g. Johnson & Ekstedt, 2007). Application of 
the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM; Hollnagel, 2012) is done textually but 
invites for the visualization of analysis results in a loosely-defined manner, e.g. through 
illustrating instantiations. 
This chapter describes the approach of this thesis. Beginning with a review in existing 
literature where the Functional Resonance Analysis Method is used in different ways and 
different industries, the theoretical background needed for the use of FRAM in this study was 
collected and reviewed. The purpose of this study, after evaluating the use on fire incidents 
onboard, is to create a common framework on FRAM functions involved in fire emergency 
responses through different types of vessels. This framework is more complete case by case 
making the use of the FRAM practical to be incorporated for future investigations, since the 
naming and couplings will be preexisting. Additionally, new scenarios could be tested and 
assessed. Fire incidents where chosen as the target for the investigation and the reports were 
collected by investigating agencies. 
3.1. Application of FRAM 
FRAM is a relatively new method that is capable to analyze the interactions within simpler 
and more complex social-technical systems. This method is chosen over traditional fault-finding 
methods where systems are assumed to work as intended and as designed unless there is a fault 
or malfunction in the component itself. While this assumption may be true for most technical 
systems it fails to include the many cases where human performance is highly variable and 
unstable, depending on external and internal factors on the system. FRAM relies on proper 
understanding of what should go right, either for future or past investigations. Examples of future 
investigations are assessment scenarios and examples of past investigations are incident 
investigations where the researcher has knowledge of the outcome in hindsight. This assist the 
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indulging on work-as-done and work-as-imagined gap, highlighting the ways variability played 
or may play an important role in system performance and, hence, the outcome. 
It is important to note that each incident requires a dedicated instantiation of the FRAM 
model that describes the event as it happened. 
Incident investigation from a FRAM perspective does not look for a cause to be initiated but 
tries to understand what should have gone right. Then, the investigator analyzes the variability of 
each function and suggests the causes based on this analysis. It is possible to make suggestions 
on this analysis alone or even suggest additions to the system that may reduce future incidents. 
Pro rata, the use of FRAM for risk assessment first describes the system with every function 
as should perform and then suggests how variability on any function may hinder the performance 
of the system as a whole. This reduces the need for complex scenarios that may fail to include a 
number of existing variability factors. 
Thus, a proper understanding of the procedure being analyzed is required. As seen in the 
literature review, the proper understanding of the different functions often limits the research or 
adds complexity for the researcher, making the use of the method harder. This thesis suggests the 
creation of a common framework as code of reference for future investigators, offering the 
ability to add any new given function that may be encountered for the framework to be 
completed. This may have practical application in large scale investigations as in fleet managing. 
Suggestions are also made based on this framework. 
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FRAM is based on four principles (Herrera & Woltjer, 2010; Hollnagel, 2004): 
Table 3 The Four principles of FRAM 
• Fails and successes derive from the same reasons. The factors for a successful operation 
are the system's capability to anticipate risks, be able to recognize and monitor the risks 
and ultimately, risk management. (Herrera & Woltjer, 2010) 
• When the variability of several functions resonates, this variability might exceed the 
normal limits and result in an incident (Hollnagel, 2004).  
• When variability of different and multiple functions resonate, the outcome of later 
functions varies in an unexpected way. (Hollnagel, 2004). 
• Socio-technical systems are highly adaptable and adjust to the threat or workload posed 
each time. This variability is necessary to control the function. The variability of one 
function is usually inadequate alone to cause an incident (Hollnagel, 2004). 
 
In short (and further discussed later in this chapter), there are four primary steps for a FRAM 
analysis depending on the purpose of the analysis (be it either incident investigation or risk 
assessment) and on the aim of each step. 
• First of all, the functions required for a procedure to have a positive outcome are 
described in detail. That description of the functions is required to create the FRAM 
model. 
• Secondly, each function's variability is described. In this step it is important to describe 
the potential variability of each function at first and then the actual variability the 
function was subject to in the instantiation being studied. 
• The third step refers to the analysis of specific instantiations and how the combined 
variability of different functions may result in incidents. 
• The fourth step consists of the actions suggested to manage the occurrences of variability 
of the necessary functions. 
In the following paragraphs of this chapter, the steps are discussed in further detail and in regard 
to the application in this thesis. 
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3.2. Identification of Functions 
The purpose of the first step is to describe the given procedure as a resultant of the functions 
needed in everyday work for it to succeed. In the words of Erik Hollnagel, the author of the 
"FRAM: the functional resonance analysis method", tasks and activities are two terms with 
significant meaning, different from one another. Task describes the work as it is imagined to be 
carried out by the designer, where activity is what is actually being done in real life situations 
like everyday work or an emergency response. The term procedure is used by the author of this 
thesis to refer to the higher function that is the target of the investigation. In the context of this 
thesis, the procedure is the emergency response on fire incidents onboard vessels. 
In the cases of incident investigations, the functions are usually adequately described by the 
investigation report. Each step of the timeline of the events that happened helps identify the 
functions. This thesis creates a common framework for fire response procedures where the same 
essential functions are frequently encountered. Through this method of identification, the 
functions identified can be used in future investigations of similar events, regardless of different 
instantiations of the model. For tasks that may not be defined, but required for a risk assessment 
scenario, description through task analysis as described by the designer of by the authorities is 
incorporated. 
In the context of FRAM, each function can be described by six features or aspects. The 
following table offers a description of these six elements: 
Table 4 Six features/aspects of FRAM 
Inputs (I) The input needed to perform the function. Gets either processed or/and 
transformed or initiates the function 
Outputs(O) The product of the function. Can either be a change in state or of 
quality of the input. 
Resources (R) Needed during the execution of the function. May be consumed to 
produce the output 
Controls/constraints 
(C) 
The supervision of the function. Can be either another function or a 
regulation, procedure or restriction 
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Preconditions (P) Need to be provided before the function is performed (e.g. hardware, 
energy, manpower) 
Time (T) Time related constrains that sets restrictions for the function. Starting 
time, end time and duration for instance. 
 
After being described, the functions are represented in a graph in form of a snowflake. 
These "snowflakes" are necessary for the complete graphical representation of each instantiation. 
In the context of this thesis, these graphical representations and, hence, the function they 
describe are kept track as data for future incidents that involve the same functions. 
 
Figure 1: The FRAM “Snowflake” 
 It is also important to define when a function starts or stops. Referring to the description 
of the functions there are four ways to initiate or terminate a function. 
Table 5 Ways to initiate or terminate a function 
A change in the input indicating a change in system state. 
A temporal constriction, either absolute or relative to another function being carried out. 
A control relation, as is "sound the alarm" from a technical perspective when temperatures reach 
150 degrees. 
A change in the preconditions or the resources. 
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Other important characterizations of the functions are of temporal and of relative 
importance. The time functions are carried out relative to other functions describe them as 
upstream or downstream functions. This is of importance when describing an instantiation of the 
model, where the researcher needs to describe the queue in which the functions take place. The 
relative importance of the functions characterizes them as foreground functions, background 
functions and performance shaping factors. Foreground functions refer to the functions that are 
being analyzed or assessed. Background functions refer to the functions that shape or are needed 
for the working environment. 
The essential system functions and components are identified through a number of 
investigative reports on fire incidents onboard. Incorporating the judgment of experts in the 
subject of firefighting onboard, professional trainers for crews, the essential functions are 
described and understood in detail .(Hollnagel, 2004). 
3.3. Variability of the functions 
Risk assessments based on the FRAM are based on functional resonance and are not 
constrained by pre-defined relations. FRAM views incidents as concurrencies of variability and 
does not make assessments on individual failures. The requirements for the application of the 
method are the potential and actual variability for the task or activity respectively. It is important 
to recognize when and how the variability may express itself and how this variability affects 
variability in later functions.  
Potential variability refers to the many ways a function may vary, where actual variability 
refers to the variability that is expected in the instantiation being studied. Both kinds of 
variability must be described for both background and foreground functions. It is also important 
for variability to be expressed from everyday variability factors as well as out-of-border 
variability, when unusual causes may apply. 
This step is important in order to analyze the potential couplings that may arise and to 
express how variability in two different functions may resonate. For example, one function may 
also vary if the input is the output of a function that varies. 
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That being said, there are three main reasons for variability of a function: 
Table 6 Main reasons for variability of a function 
A kind of external variability derives from a change in the conditions the functions is being 
carried out such as changes in the work environment. This is described as external variability 
Variability of an output may arise from the changes in the function itself. This kind of internal 
variability is due to the way the function is performed. 
Also the variability may be the result of the variability of upstream functions, when either inputs, 
preconditions, resources, control or time may vary. The aforementioned couplings are the focus 
of functional resonance.  
 
An important action in this step of the FRAM, indeed for this thesis, is the characterization 
according to their type. That is, technological functions, human functions and organizational 
functions. This thesis finds this categorization especially important since all functions must be 
available for reviewing. Technological functions describe functions carried out by various 
machinery. These include technologies for collecting, storing, processing, analyzing and 
transmitting data and are often automated processes. Human functions are the result of individual 
humans, or small groups of people. This category has the highest frequencies of variability with 
significant outcomes. Last but not least, organizational functions, carried out by large groups of 
people, are highly organized. The effects of the variations are large but usually are of large 
magnitude. 
After describing the potential variability of the functions it is crucial to distinguish between 
internal and external variability. Internal variability in technological systems is well known and 
either purely mechanical or due to the wear of time. For humans, internal variability is a result of 
physiological factors (stress, fatigue) and psychological factors that affect the elements of the 
second chapter. For the FRAM perspective, organizational variability can express itself in many 
different ways. External variability on the other hand may be expressed in improper maintenance 
and extreme working conditions for technological systems. Human functions may be affected by 
external variability sourced in technological and organizational reasons. Lastly, organizational 
external variability is mainly influenced by environmental, physical and legislative factors.  
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These notes are necessary for the proper application of FRAM in the later cases. 
While the potential variability refers to the possible outcomes of the varied functions, actual 
variability refers to what should be expected in a given case. The instantiations in FRAM (for 
example, an incident investigation) require the actual variability either in hindsight or expressed 
in a realistic way describing what would be expected under the real-life conditions of the case. 
3.4. Functional Resonance  
The third step of a FRAM model is to describe the functional resonance. The set of functions 
described in a FRAM model are able to create several couplings between them. This way, it is 
possible to describe only the potential performance variability. The instantiations on the other 
hand, create a concrete set of couplings for a given case (either assumed or actual) and for 
specific conditions. Therefore, the potential variability is assessed as to how it can lead to actual 
variability. However, describing the actual –or the potential for that matter- variability is not 
enough for a complete research. The most important aspect of the FRAM model is the ability to 
assess how variability from different functions may combine and how this can lead to functional 
resonance. 
As discussed earlier, the way a function may vary can be the result of either the function 
itself or the conditions it was carried out. The variability of a function can also be due to 
couplings to upstream functions, where the output of an upstream function may vary and 
therefore affect the variability of a downstream function (where it is used as input, precondition, 
control, resource or time). In certain situations, functions may amplify or dampen the carried 
variability of an upstream function. If a function has such an effect, it should be noted for further 
investigation. 
All dependencies, both intended and unintended should be defined in order to describe the 
functional resonance within a system. The function’s aspects, input, output, time, preconditions, 
control and resources must be matched to each other so the functions will be connected. It is 
important for the researcher to use proper naming among those functions for the connections to 
be used by the FRAM software and ultimately for the creation of a common framework that has 
functions ready and easy to use in future investigations or assessments. These couplings that will 
be created allow the researcher to analyze the possible aggregation of variability that is needed 
for unexpected outcomes. As noted in earlier chapters, rarely variability in a single function that 
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is not carried out to downstream functions can single-handedly affect the performance of the 
whole system. The aggregated variability from different functions however can greatly vary the 
outcome leading to unexpected results. 
The created connections also allow the researcher to visually observe the procedure and 
highlight how a component’s variability can impact another function’s performance variability. 
The graphical representation of the FRAM is helpful for the identification of dependencies and 
the identification of functional resonance.  
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3.5. Suggestions for improvement 
The last step of the FRAM method is to propose ways the aforementioned variability is 
controlled wherever it is expected change the expected outcome. Amplifying effects of functions 
on variability from upstream functions and uncontrolled performance should be managed. In the 
cases that the performance variability leads to positive results, FRAM suggests the management 
of the functions to facilitate and enhance the outcome since the latter is desirable. 
The purpose of FRAM is to describe how performance variability may occur in every-day 
work operations and how the effects of the variability may migrate and enhance the variability 
on later functions. After this analysis the potential hazardous areas of the system should be 
managed to reduce the occurrences of such events or to mitigate the damage of the varied total 
outcome of the procedure. This can either be done by: 
Table 7 Ways to increase resilience of a system 
Eliminating the hazards founds by removing or changing the involved components. This method 
may be effective for specific case scenarios but usually has sub marginal results in different 
occurrences.  
Another used solution for improvement is prevention. Prevention refers to the addition of 
barriers and defenses that may have dampening effects of the variability not to spread or damage 
mitigating effects if variability comes out of the expected borders. It is crucial to be accompanied 
by trade off analysis since usually come with reductions in speed and performance of the whole 
procedures. It is within this thesis analysis to suggest preventive measures through functions that 
are not taxing to the procedures they are involved. 
The next solution is facilitation. Facilitation may involve the redesign of the system so it is more 
user-friendly and aim to make the system less complex. There are a lot of similarities to the 
prevention method but in the case of facilitation, instead of reducing harmful occurrences the 
aim is to enhance positive ones.  
Lastly, protection refers to the damage mitigating methods that are used mainly after the 
incident occurs. While protection is a reactive tool, it needs to be designed proactively. Since this 
thesis analyzes fire incidents, protection elements on procedures are the focus of our 
investigation. 
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FRAM proposes two additional solutions to the aforementioned. Monitoring and dampening. 
Monitoring requires an extensive understanding of the system, its components and the processes 
that are involved. The selection of indicators is for monitoring is a difficult procedure which 
FRAM aids by proper understanding of the functions within the system and the expression of 
variability amongst them. Hence, FRAM models are very useful for proposing indicators. 
Functions’ variability is as mentioned before in this thesis due to internal, external factors and 
due to upstream-downstream couplings. In the latter case, the transferred variability can and 
should be managed to reduce the effects on downstream functions, while the downstream 
functions can, by themselves, have a dampening effect that decreases variability later on. 
To effectively manage a system, proper knowledge of its components is not enough. The 
manager, whoever he may be, needs to be able to intervene in the process and develop the 
needed outcome. 
3.6. The FRAM Model Visualizer 
 
The FRAM Model Visualizer is a software tool that allows the researcher to automatically 
create the graphical representation of a FRAM model. The FRAM Model Visualizer was 
developed by Rees Hill and this contribution to the FRAMily was significant. The FRAM Model 
Visualizer is developed in adobe air platform and is free for use. It is important to present some 
key features of the software tool in order to comprehend the results in later chapters accurately. 
Since the FRAM analyses any incident from a systemic perspective, the visual representation is 
an important addition for the ease-of-use of the method. Through this research, the software tool 
was found especially helpful for the analysis of the complex socio-technical system, allowing for 
better comprehension of the instantiation. The graphical representation produced by the software 
tool was also useful as a reference point when needed reducing the total time needed. 
The layout of the FRAM Model Visualizer consists of two pane areas. The left panel, called 
“The function pane”, is the area where a function is described. All the aspects that were 
described earlier (Input, Output, Control, Time, Precondition, Resource) are in detail in the pane. 
The function pane also includes the name and a short description of the function if needed. The 
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functions can be characterized as technological, human or organizational and the variability can 
be described and represented visually with a curved line inside the FRAM “snowflake”.  
 
Figure 2 FRAM software main screen 
The Visualizer pane is the area where all the functions are represented graphically. The 
software matches the states of all the Outputs defined by the user to create a web with the 
connections defined. For example, if an Output of a function is ‘fire assessed’ and the Input of a 
downstream function is ‘fire assessed’, the visualizer pane will create this connection with a 
curved line, with the state ‘fire assessed’ written clearly on the line. It is important to note that 
the state must have the exact same name on both functions and it is case-sensitive. Moreover, the 
variability of the function can be described for any function. Finally, the software tool includes 
some rendering options for different representations.  
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If the function in question is a technological function the table of variability is as follows: 
 
Figure3 Technological Function – Table of Variability 
While, if the function is a human function the variability table is:
 
Figure 4 Human Function - Table of Variability 
 
 Page | 35  
 
Lastly, if the function in question is organizational the table is as follows: 
 
Figure 5 Organizational Function - Table of Variability 
Both pop-up tables can be used to mark the variability of any function. 
The FRAM Model Visualizer can export the function as they were described by the 
researcher in a .PDF file format and the graphical representation can be extracted as a .PNG file 
format with clear image sharpness.  
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Figure 6 Function List on software 
An additional capability of the software 
tool is to record preset sequences of events. 
This allows for clear understanding of the 
events that happen and how the couplings 
were created. This was not found useful by 
this thesis analysis and is only being 
mentioned in this paragraph. 
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4. State-of-the-Art 
 
A growing body of scientists (Amalberti, 2001; Dekker, 2004; Hollnagel, 2004) suggest that 
there is indeed a need for new incident models in order to understand concepts such as “incident” 
and “incident” and their effects on safety –as an emergent property of system. Furthermore, 
turning away from a human-centred perspective that focuses on single events and human errors, 
to a system-centred perspective (Holden, 2009) will provide an in-depth understanding of 
incident causes and why incidents occur, giving us the possibility to effectively and proactively 
manage safety. 
During recent years, systemic incident analysis methods have been developed (Leveson, 
Dulac, Marais, & Carroll, 2009; Stoop & Dekker, 2009). 
The method for modelling complex socio-technical systems used in the course of this study is 
the Functional Resonance Analysis Method, in the following referred to as the FRAM. This 
method will be discussed in detail with a dedicated chapter.  
In addition to the mentioned ongoing research, several organizations are funding actions that 
investigate maritime safety and safety in transportation as the European Union (EU), European 
Research Council (ERC), European Maritime Safety Organization (EMSA) and the IMO. 
Indicative projects that deliver(ed) tangible results that increase the level of safety onboard ships 
are: 
Table 8 Ongoing research on maritime safety 
eVACUATE A holistic scenario – independent, situation-awareness  
and guidance System for sustaining the Active Evacuation Route for 
large Crowds 
HOLISHIP HOLIstic optimization of SHIP design and operation for life cycle 
SAFENVSHIP Develop, evaluate and validate methodologies and tools for design of 
the next generation cruise/ferry ships related to: 1. Safety: fire 
protection, structural (hydroelasticity), wind effects/evaluation. 2. 
Environment: clean sea/air. 
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LYNCEUS2MARKET On-board and overboard people localization, person activity 
monitoring, real-time disaster escalation monitoring and adaptive 
decision support 
LETS-CROWD Real time crowd behaviour forecasting models inevacuation 
strategies 
FLOODSTAND Flooding sumulation tools, ship response and rescue process 
modelling 
 
These funded projects are a sample of the ongoing research in the field of maritime safety. 
Maritime safety consists a complex challenge that needs to be assessed through different routes 
and methodologies given its highly non-deterministic nature. FRAM offers an alternative 
solution of great value in tackling such challenges via a different perspective. 
The following is a list of academic papers related to this study with a brief summary with 
more detail in the items of this study’s focus. It is important to emphasize the areas that these 
methods have already been used for a better understanding of this thesis perspective and goals. 
Resilience Assessment Based on Models of Functional Resonance: 
This paper examines process-based methods for the assessment of Resilience. This need 
is due to the fact that sociotechnical systems are highly complex with little importance given on 
system outputs because of their inability to capture the dynamics within the system. The authors 
of this paper explore the potential of FRAM to evaluate five important resilience characteristics. 
There are buffering capacity, flexibility, margin, tolerance and cross-scale interactions. The case 
of Alaska Airlines flight 261 incident was studied under the prism of FRAM and the model was 
evaluated for resilience assessment potential.  In serendipity, during the research and in search 
for the answers the authors challenged the definition of these characteristics. (Rogier Woltjer, 
2017) 
The case of Herald of Free Enterprise: 
The tragic incident of the Roll on/Roll off Ferry Herald of Free Enterprise lead to a 
human-centered view on the investigation of its causes.  The formal investigation report 
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concluded that both the crewmembers and the shipping company were responsible for the 
incident. The perspective that views incidents as the outcome of a chain of events leading to an 
unwanted consequence is researched for more than 20 years.  This paper attempts to reanalyze 
this incident from a systemic point of view utilizing FRAM to identify what may have caused the 
ship to capsize.  High focus is given on whether incident analysis can help proactively improve 
the safe operation of ships. 
It was the first time an incident investigation took into account the decisions made on 
shore that affected the safe operation at the vessel and held (partly) the shipping company 
accountable.  
This article reanalyses the incident of the Herald of Free Enterprise. The analysis is built 
solely upon the formal investigation report (Department of Transport, 1987) using the functional 
resonance analysis method (FRAM) developed by Hollnagel (2004). 
The first step of the analysis was to identify the 34 functions derived from the report and 
then described to sex characteristics. After the functions had been described by their 
characteristics, the potential variability for each function was determined with the help of the 11 
CPCs, each representing aspects of human, technological and organizational context in which the 
function is executed.  Later, the functions were graphically represented and connected based on 
their relation to each other. Based on the model, suggestions for countermeasures were 
formulated. The paper could not provide new conclusion on the incident’s causes but provided 
deeper understanding of FRAM and its potential. (Gesa Praetorius, Monica Lundh et 
Margareta Lützhöft, 2017) 
Resilience Engineering Approach to Safety Assessment: An Application of FRAM for the 
MSAW system: 
The Minimum Safety Altitude Warning system (MSAW) alerts the Air Traffic Controller 
(ATCO) of potential Controlled Flight into Terrain and Controlled Flight into Obstacles and 
provides with adequate time and instructions to be issued to the pilot. This study describes a 
safety assessment of the MSAW. Beginning with identification and description of the functions 
using FRAM, the authors evaluate the introduction of MSAW into an existing ATCO FRAM 
model. The evaluation is based on functions’ performance variability and on the occurrence of 
unexpected combinations. MSAW is a system designed to run on the background, not disrupting 
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existing ATC processes and alerting (with sufficient time) serious path deviations and Controlled 
Flight into Terrain or Obstacle (Luigi Macchi, Erik Hollnagel and Jorg Leonhard, 2016). This 
paper analyses the system functions to create the FRAM model. Then, several scenarios are 
created and each function’s variability is evaluated including technical and human factors. The 
risk assessment is based on the performance of the complex system that takes into account the 
interactions between functions. 
Analysis of interdependencies within the firefighting function on an off shore platform: 
This thesis challenges the energy-barrier philosophy as the ruling principle in offshore 
safety. The issue identified in this philosophy is the paradoxical increased complexity and the 
neglect on the complex interactions within the system. The different method suggested by the 
author to study interdependencies in an offshore platform barrier system is FRAM, and it is used 
for the analysis of the firefighting function on an offshore platform.  The two major parts of this 
project are a) to identify and describe the functions and to b) analyze the variability and 
functional resonance in former model. This paper both access whether interdependencies in 
barrier system matters and also apply a method to interpret interdependencies in a barrier system 
and evaluate the method used. Part of the extensive system is only taken into account due to 
complexity. The use of FRAM is detailed and the countermeasures are evaluated. FRAM 
analysis illustrated the interdependencies on the system during one risk assessment scenario and 
two events when happening. It is important to note that this thesis opened ways for future 
research as it was discussed. (Jens Εhman, 2013) 
Model-Based Safety Assessment using FRAM for complex systems: 
This paper examines the use of FRAM, as a new methodology that values the interactions 
within complex systems instead of the usual couplings provided by other methods. A model 
based safety assessment using FRAM is proposed to identify hazards and analyze incident 
scenarios. The case of landing process of an airplane is demonstrated as an example of the 
model’s use. (Q. Yang & J. Tian, 2015) 
Automation of the FRAM method for the purpose of hazard analysis: 
This research comes from Slovenia Control to examine FRAM as an automated 
complimentary tool for safety assessment.  It is noted, that the only acceptable mean of 
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compliance to ESARR4 as of today is SAM, a tool most suitable for hardware changes from the 
design process. The goal of this study is to come up with an algorithm to describe FRAM as a 
finite state machine (M.Pielick, Slovenia Control Ltd., Zgornji Brnik, Slovenia & prof.M.Mraz, 
PhD, Faculty of Computer and Information Science University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, 2016).  
Here, simulation clarifies the consequences of the relations that are described in the FRAM 
model, which can then be tested against observations in the real world. Simple and elaborate 
descriptive data capture most consequences and are able to refine their description. The potential 
variability and the description of performance variability attempts to quantify FRAM without 
assigning numerical values to a performance variability state but with discrete probability 
distribution functions. The authors examine assigning each function with weight of significance 
and a specific index to represent damping or amplifying effect of each coupling. The solution of 
calculated instantiations (where FRAM is interpreted as a network or graph) could meet the 
practical demand for quantitative results. 
Functional modeling for risk assessment of automation in a changing air traffic management 
environment: 
This research examines the effects on the automation proposal of the ERASMUS project. 
The ERASMUS project proposes a slight adjustment to the aircraft speed to avoid conflicts and 
the argument to inform the pilot or adjust automatically is examined in this paper. Various 
instantiations of a partial model   resulting by the application of FRAM are presented to evaluate 
the impact of the ERASMUS application on controller and pilot. The motivation for this paper is 
the usually problematic application of automation in a complex system. Through observations, 
interview and the aggregation of identified functions in published models of en route control, the 
controller functions are identified and the FRAM model is completed after the usual steps of the 
method. (R. Woltjer and E. Hollnagel, 2008) 
Decision support analysis for safety control in complex project environment based on Bayesian 
Networks: 
This paper suggests a systemic decision support model based on Bayesian Networks for 
safety control in dynamic complex project environments.  Firstly, expert knowledge and training 
data are integrated to produce a reliable and adaptable model. Then, Model Bias and Model 
Accuracy assess the effectiveness of the Network by comparing the results with actual 
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observations.  Finally, the safety control process is extended to the entire life cycle of the system. 
The study provides a supportive tool for decision makers taking ground settlement during Wuhan 
Changjiang Metro Shield Tunnel Construction as a case study by demonstrating the feasibility of 
a BN model and its potential. (Limao Zhang, Xianguo Wu, Lieyun Ding, Miroslaw J. 
Skibniewski, Y.Yan, 2012) 
Safety is an emergent property: Illustrating functional resonance in Air Traffic Management with 
formal verification: 
The inspiration of this paper is the frequent investigator incapability to explain how 
emergent phenomena appear and develop. It is considered that functional resonance is 
insufficient in explaining how the resonance occurs in certain scenarios. Also, it is considered 
that the methods that utilize functional resonance are limited regarding hazard identification. The 
paper attempts, with the use of FRAM to develop a comprehensive approach by formal 
verification tool SPIN. The FRAM is selected because of the ability to monitor system functions. 
The approach is applied to Air Traffic Management system where Minimum Safe Altitude 
Warning is introduced. The aim is to illustrate how minor variability of different functions can 
result in significant effects to the performance of the aforementioned system. (Qibo Yang, Jin 
Tian, Tingdi Zhao, 2017) 
Developing a Risk-Based Approach for Optimizing Human Reliability Assessment in an 
Offshore Operation: 
This paper estimates the probability of system failure due to human error in light 
structure lift in sea. The authors select the FRAM to create the non-linear socio-technical 
function network of this procedure. The FRAM model is integrated with Success Likelihood 
Index Method (SLIM) considering human errors. The study quantifies the qualification process 
of the FRAM and applies in an offshore oil platform. The Event Tree is conducted to assess the 
consequences afterwards indicating that the integration of the mentioned tools have application 
in the offshore platform industry. (Ahmad Bahoo Toroody, Mohammad Mahdi Abaiee, Reza 
Gholamnia, Mohammad Bahoo Torody, Nastaran Hekmat Nejad, 2016)  
A white paper on resilience engineering for Air Traffic Control: 
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In this white paper the authors examine the value of resilience engineering to provide 
assurance of the Air Traffic Management safety. After a complete description of the usefulness 
of performance variability and the facilitation of resilience engineering in Air Traffic 
Management System, the paper suggests that more effort should be given on developing a more 
complete model for resilience engineering application. The resilience engineering approach 
needs to mature and future research is required. (European Organization for the Safety of Air 
Navigation (EUROCONTROL), 2009) 
An application of the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) to Risk Assessment of 
Organizational Change: 
This study aims to examine an alternative approach to risk assessment of organizational 
changes, utilizing the principles of resilience engineering. Considering that the current 
approaches accept risk as a result of failure or malfunction, the application of the Functional 
Resonance Analysis Method is selected. Resilience engineering proposes that failures are the 
result of the same variations that are necessary for success (Erik Hollnagel, 2013). The analysis 
via this approach offers a new perspective of the system from a systemic point of view. 
Intermediate report of MoReMO. Modeling Resilience for Maintenance and Outage: 
During this study the FRAM is used for the safety analysis of nuclear power plants. 
Nuclear power plants are an organization that is subject to large modification projects and 
increased need for more efficient safety procedures. The systemic approach is utilized to develop 
and test models to analyze safe performance in critical activities during routine operations 
(Oedewald P., Macchi L., Axelsson C., Eirtheim M.H.R., 2012). Integrating Organizational Core 
Task modeling, Efficiency Thoroughness Trade-Off and Work Practice and Culture 
Characterization with the FRAM the paper provides significant insight on understanding 
everyday work practices. The common grounds of the two industries are noticeable with the need 
of improved safety system and the presence of high risk hazards. 
A Monte Carlo evolution of the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) to assess 
performance variability in complex systems: 
This paper integrates the FRAM with Monte Carlo evaluation to apply to the Air Traffic 
Management (ATM) system in order to examine the technological, human and organizational 
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components of the system. The ATM is chosen as a high risk environment with significant socio-
technical interactions. The innovative model attempts to quantify critical points in Monte Carlo 
simulation and applies to the ATM process.  
The FRAM is also used in workplace safety (Amorim and Pereira, 2015) , in medical 
science (Pereira, 2013; Clay-Williams et al., 2015; Alm and Woltjer, 2010),in transportation 
management (Belmonte et al.,2011; Praetorious et al.,2015), and in oil exploitation (Aguilera et 
al.,2016). 
The value of this literature review is to present some examples of the application of the 
method in different industries. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the use of FRAM in fire 
incident on board vessel. Therefore, the applications that are already in place assist in developing 
a more complete model for the system in this thesis. This review offered valuable insight on the 
use of the model and on the needs for future research are proposed by the aforementioned 
authors. 
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5. Instantiations of two cases 
In this chapter, two separate cases of marine incidents are examined with the analysis of 
functional resonance. The aim of this chapter is to attempt to make recommendations that derive 
from the functional analysis of the events, utilizing the Functional Resonance Analysis Method.  
The incidents are first described as happened. The description is trusted to the official 
investigations’ reports. The focus of the description is on one hand to provide a wider perception 
of the event and on the other to comprehensively describe the events as they happened. 
Afterwards, the functions necessary for the application of FRAM are described. The 
description is based on the functions identified from the event as happened as this is considered 
to be a realistic response to the presented and other similar hazards. To identification, as FRAM 
instructs, is a description of the function with the respected aspects. The aspects are described in 
detail as they were selected.  The analysis in this thesis describes an increased amount of 
functions to examine the value of this approach. It is believed that there is a limit to the detail of 
the description as more functions can become redundant. The data used for the course of this 
paper comes from UK’s Marine Incident Investigation Branch (MAIB).  
Following the descriptions of the functions, a complete analysis of the variability observed is 
attempted.  The variability of the Output due to internal variability and the upstream-downstream 
variability observed is analysed and presented in a table, as the application of FRAM instructs. 
The model is then presented in graphical representation form extracted from the FRAM 
Model Visualizer, the provided software for the ease of use of the FRAM. The analysis of the 
functions’ variability and the graphical representation provided data on functional resonance 
which are described in later paragraphs. 
The investigation terminates when suggestions are made using the principles of resilience 
engineering. The aim is to increase the responsiveness of the system in similar incidents rather 
than preventing the incident from occurring. Even though such an approach certainly has value, 
the approach of this thesis is focused on systemic analysis of the functions. In cases were 
functions were added as a suggestion, the updated graphical representation of the system is 
presented. Through systemic analysis of the socio-technical system the human liability is given 
focus.  
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5.1. Case “Commodore Clipper” 
Description of the Event 
A fire occurred on 16 June 2010 on the Commodore Clipper while on passage from 
Jersex to Portsmouth. The fire was caused by the electrical supply of a refrigerated unit because 
of an arc, created by high resistance on the cables. Besides the actual reasons of the ignition, it is 
worth noticing that crew members on watch, bypassed the alarm several times because they were 
thought as false (perception that was further supported by rushed on-spot inspection for smoke). 
Also, the afterwards procedures were challenged by a reported confusion about jurisdiction and 
responsibilities issues that further delayed the response.  
CCTV image of the main vehicle deck became hazy. Shortly afterwards, the machinery 
control alarm sounded indicating an earth fault at the bus-tie break that connected two electrical 
circuits. Meanwhile, the third engineer on watch heard a noise. After a short period of time the 
CCTV showed much darkened images of the main vehicle deck. The smoke alarm activated 
indicating smoke in the same compartment. After 30 seconds, nearby fire sensors detected fire. 
The third engineer then reported the alarm to the bridge where the second officer was on duty. 
This communication was made via telephone. The second officer instructed a lookout to confirm 
the fire in the main vehicle deck via VHF. The lookout first visited the passenger restaurant 
where two crew members confirmed the smell of smoke. Meanwhile, the third engineer bypassed 
the alarms for a total of 81 times since he believed there was a malfunction in the detection 
system. Thus, he called the electrical fitter to check the fire detection system. The alarm was 
reset with additional sensors indicating fire after rebooting. The report to the bridge from the 
third engineer confirmed no fire. The second officer received eight VHF calls that were 
incomprehensible since it was known that the portable VHF was in bad condition. The electrical 
fitter encountered smoke when trying to enter the main vehicle deck and retreated. He reported to 
the third engineer and later to the bridge and the two men isolated the power supplies to the 
refrigerated units. The third engineer initiated the auxiliary generator to take the load off the 
shaft generator. The CCTV images continued to get increasingly darker with little to no 
visibility. The ventilation fans were stopped automatically as they were designed. Another alarm 
for a faulty earth of a bus-tie break sounded. Meanwhile, the lookout confirmed the fire. The 
chief engineer decided to check for himself and sounded the alarm and the general emergency 
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signal. He later checked the ventilation fans on the vehicle decks to be closed and initiated the 
drenching system. Shortly after, the water leakage alarm sounded indicating water started to 
drain. The hotel staff checked each cabin and directed the passengers to the assembly stations. 
The crew mustered in the one of the required stations since the second one was unreachable. The 
lookout, with EECB entered the vehicle deck and confirmed and assessed the magnitude and 
position of the fire. The master then reported to coast with no distress signal. Coast requested the 
Marine Incident Response Group (MIRG) to standby as well as experienced firefighters (HFRS) 
if needed onboard. The chief engineer requested the bridge to send someone to close the exhaust 
dampers manually and two crew members succeeded. Then, the chief officer ordered boundary 
cooling from the upper deck where smoke and high temperatures were recorded. This was done 
via the drenching system and fire hoses. The CCTV showed large clouds of steam in the 
compartment and the crew were unable to attack the fire because the hoses were reported hot and 
the maneuverability was limited. The master requested help via helicopter and it was confirmed. 
The vessel maintained normal course at full speed through the incident in an attempt to reach the 
port. There were delays because of misconceptions on whether help was needed or discussed as 
an option. The fire was contained. The water created serious list and the drenching system was 
turned off and on to tackle this with success. The steering pump later failed and the rudder 
turned. Unable to control the vessel the master requested assistance with a tug boat. Smoke was 
later detected in the accommodation through a large green staircase that fed air to the fire. The 
fire screen doors were closed and all the drenchers were activated. The vessel had lost the bow 
thrusters and the steering gear, with no power to neither anchor nor maneuver.  
Identification of the functions 
The construction of the instantiation is independent of the starting point and FRAM does 
not provide guidance for the selection of the starting point. Since this thesis focus is incidents on 
board vessels, it is vital to define the events that signalled the initiation of the system’s response 
as well as boundaries to the analysis. Thus, the vessels evacuation was considered the final 
function.  However, it is important to note that the instantiation is complete with the fire response 
since the initiation through the flooding caused by the drenching system and the damages to the 
machinery until the communication with authorities throughout the incident. It must be noted 
that the function identification process is not linear but in this thesis best efforts are presented in 
the most understandable mean possible.  
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Name of Function Evacuate Ship 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Vessel Arrived at Port 
Output N/A (Not Applicable) 
Precondition Passengers Assembled 
Resource N/A 
Control Fire Contained 
Time N/A 
Table 9 Function - Evacuate Ship 
In order to evacuate the ship properly in this incident, the vessel must arrive at the port. 
Thus, the Input of the “Evacuate Ship” described in the table above is the state “Vessel Arrived 
at Port”. This function has Control the “Fire Contained” state since the function may not 
performed as intended if the fire is not contained and passengers are trapped or unable to 
disembark. The function “Contain Fire” is identified. The Input state can be achieved through 
two different means. The first is for the vessel to maintain course and anchor safely on port. 
Thus, the function “Maintain Course” is identified. Also, the function “Tug vessel” is identified 
in hindsight to the incident since the vessel arrived at port towed. The precondition for this 
function to perform as intended is to have the passengers assembled. Thus the function 
“Assemble Passengers” is identified but discussed later. 
Name of Function Maintain Course 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output Vessel Arrived at Port 
Precondition Bow Thrusters Activated 
List Maintained 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
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Time N/A 
Table 10 Function - Maintain Course 
The output of the function “Maintain Course” is to arrive at the port. For this action to 
complete, again in hindsight in order to omit the factors that did not contribute to the incident, 
two preconditions are identified. First the bow thrusters must be activated and so the function 
“Activate Bow Thrusters” is identified. Also, the function “Maintain list” is required as a 
precondition for this function to perform as intended.  
Name of Function Maintain List 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output List Maintained 
Precondition Water Drained 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 11 Function -  Maintain List 
The output of the function “Maintain List” is to have the necessary list for seakeeping. 
The precondition of this function to perform as intended is to have a well-balanced cargo and no 
free surface effect from the water used to attack the fire. Thus, the water must be drained and a 
new function is identified, “Drain water”. 
Name of Function Activate Bow Thrusters 
Description The bow thrusters can be activated both 
remotely and manually. 
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output Bow Thrusters Activated 
Precondition Power Provided 
Resource N/A 
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Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 12 Function -  Activate Bow Thrusters 
The output of the function “Activate Bow Thrusters” is to have the vessel’s bow thrusters 
ready and functional for manoeuvring. The necessary precondition for this function is to have 
power supplied to the thrusters regardless of manual or remote use. Thus the function “Power 
Provided” is identified. 
Name of Function Provide Power 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output Power Provided 
Precondition N/A 
Resource Backup Generator Initiated 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 13 Function -  Provide Power 
The obvious output of the function “Provide Power” is to have power provided where 
needed. In case of a generator failure, there is a backup generator that needs to be initiated to 
support the electrical circuit. The function “Initiate Backup Generator” is identified but will be 
described later. 
Name of Function Tug Vessel 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Tug Boat Sent 
Output Vessel Arrived at Port 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control Tug Boat Requested 
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Time N/A 
Table 14 Function -  Tug Vessel 
The function “Tug vessel” has the output of the vessel being towed to port. In order for 
this function to perform efficiently the tug boat must be requested by the vessel’s master and sent 
by port authorities. The input to initiate the function is to send the Tug board under authorities’ 
orders but since approval is needed by the vessel’s master the function has control “Tug boat 
requested” in the sense of a formal request. 
Name of Function Contain Fire 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Water Applied to Fire 
Output Fire Contained 
Precondition Fire Suffocated 
Resource N/A 
Control Boundaries Cooled 
Time N/A 
Table 15 Function -  Contain Fire 
This higher function is needed to contain the fire, mitigating the spread and ensuring the 
safety of the passengers. As discussed in earlier chapters, the goal of the emergency response is 
primarily to contain the fire until external help arrives. This function could be the end result of 
the analysis if the focus was solely on the fire emergency response of the system. Since the 
socio-technical system and the result of the incident greatly depended on the actions taken ashore 
and the fact that the containment of the fire resulted in excess weight from water applied to the 
fire. The input of the function “Contain Fire” is to have water applied to the fire. The 
precondition is to have the fire deprived of air and the function is maintained only if the 
boundaries are cooled. Thus, the functions “Cut Air Supply”, “Cool Boundaries” are identified. 
The input “water applied to fire” can be obtained from two functions. At first, the fire party of 
the vessel must apply water to the fire, hence the function “Fight Fire Manually” is identified. 
Since, the fire party is not as qualified as experienced fire-fighters from ashore, the function 
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“Send Helicopter Aid” is identified, referring to the assistance of experienced fire-fighters from 
ashore.  
Name of Function Cut Air Supply 
Description In order to successfully contain the fire, air 
supply to the compartment must be reduced 
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Fire Doors Closed 
Output Fire Suffocated 
Precondition Ventilation Stopped 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 16 Function -  Cut Air supply 
The Output of the function “Cut Air Supply” is to have the fire deprived of oxygen. In 
order to perform as intended, the fire screen doors must be closed, and this is done by the fire 
party. Hence, the already identified function “Fight Fire Manually” will have this state as an 
Output. Also, the ventilation must be stopped as a precondition, since constant air supply from 
the ductings can negatively affect performance. The ventilation is automatically stopped when 
smoke is detected and performed as intended. Thus, the function “Automatically Detect Smoke” 
is identified. 
Name of Function Automatically Detect Smoke 
Description Smoke detectors 
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output Smoke Detected Automatically 
Ventilation Stopped 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
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Time N/A 
Table 17 Function -  Automatically Detect Smoke 
The Output of the function “Automatically detect smoke” is both to automatically close 
the ventilation in the compartment and to alert crew members on watch that smoke was detected 
automatically. The latter Output will be the Input in later functions. The system is automatic and 
the possible input is the smoke from the fire that constitutes the starting point for this 
instantiation. 
Name of Function Fight Fire Manually 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Fire Confirmed 
Output Fire Doors Closed 
Water Applied to Boundaries 
Water Applied to Fire 
Precondition Power Supply Isolated 
Fire Assessed 
Resource Firefighting Equipment Provided 
Control N/A 
Time Fire Party Mustered 
Table 18 Function -  Fight Fire Manually 
The Outcomes of the function “Fight Fire Manually” are both to apply water to the fire 
and to have the fire screen doors closed. The first Outcome will come useful in later descriptions. 
The Input for this function to initiate is to have the fire confirmed, thus the function “Confirm 
Fire” is identified. Another outcome of the manual fire fighting is to apply water on boundaries 
needed later for boundary cooling. The preconditions for this function to perform as intended are 
to have the power supply near the fire isolated and to have the fire assessed in order for the fire 
party to have situational awareness. Thus the functions “Isolate Power Supply” and “Confirm 
Fire” (also referring to assessing the magnitude) are identified. The resource of this function is to 
have the fire fighting equipment provided for the attack. Thus, the function “Provide Fire 
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Fighting Equipment” is identified. Also, the time the function initiates is depended on the time 
the fire party is mustered. Thus, the function “Sound Crew Emergency Alarm” is identified.  
Name of Function Isolate Power Supply 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Electrical Fitter Summoned 
Output Power Supply Isolated 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 19 Function -  Isolate Power Supply 
The power supply is isolated under the watch of either the electrical fitter or an engineer. 
In this instantiation the electrical fitter was summoned to isolate the power supply when the 
alarm was interpreted, thus the function “Interpret Alarm” is identified. 
Name of Function Provide Firefighting Equipment 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output Firefighting Equipment Provided 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 20 Function -  Provide Firefighting Equipment 
The Outcome of this background function is to provide the necessary equipment for the fire 
fighting efforts. 
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Name of Function Confirm Fire 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Lookout Sent 
Engineer on watch sent 
Output Fire Assessed 
Fire Confirmed 
Precondition N/A 
Resource Firefighting Equipment Provided 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 21 Function -  Confirm Fire 
The Outcome of the function “Confirm Fire” is to both confirm the existence of the fire 
and assess the magnitude of the fire. In order for this function to perform as intended a lookout 
was sent to the compartments where the alarms were indicating fire. Since the lookout was sent 
to confirm from the bridge, the function “Supervise from Bridge” is identified. Also, as a second 
input to this function, an engineer was sent to assess the fire again. The engineer was sent there 
in order to assess the damage and assist his decision making, as a result of the interpretation of 
the alarm that was described in the “Interpret Alarm” function. The resources for this function is 
to have fire fighting equipment provided for the lookout and the engineer in order to come as 
close as possible and identify the extent of the damage accurately. This resource is provided by 
the earlier function “Provide Fire Fighting Equipment” 
Name of Function Interpret Alarm 
Description Crew member on watch evaluates the alarm 
signal 
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Smoke Detected Automatically 
Bus-Tie Break Alarm 
Fire Detected Automatically 
Output Report to Bridge 
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Electrical Fitter Summoned 
Engineer on watch sent 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 22 Function -  Interpret Alarm 
The Output of the function “Interpret Alarm” is to report the alarms to the bridge, to 
summon the electrical fitter since electrical circuits alarms were also sounded, and to send the 
engineer on watch to confirm and assess the fire. The Inputs of this function was the sound of the 
smoke detection system, a bus-tie alarm and the fire sensors alarming. Thus the functions 
“Automatically Detect Fire” and “Automatically Monitor Electrical Circuits” are identified. The 
Function “Automatically Detect Smoke” is already identified.  
Name of Function Automatically Monitor Electrical Circuits 
Description The vessel supplied refrigerated units with 
electricity 
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output Bus-Tie Break Alarm 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 23 Function -  Automatically Monitor Electrical Circuits 
The Output in this instantiation of this technological function is to alert of earth faults in 
bus-tie break alarms. The input is not described since the detection of the fault that is our starting 
point caused the alarm. 
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Name of Function Automatically Detect Fire 
Description Via Fire Sensors 
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output Fire Detected Automatically 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 24 Function -  Automatically Detect Fire 
The Outcome of the function “Automatically Detect Fire” is to detect the fire via the fire 
sensors. When the fire sensors detected the heat from the fire, that is our starting event, the fire 
detection alarm was sounded.  
Name of Function Initiate Backup Generator 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Electrical Fitter Summoned 
Output Backup Generator Initiated 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 25 Function -  Initate Backup Generator 
The Outcome of this function is to have the backup generator initiated if needed. This 
function was carried out by the electrical fitter after the interpretation of the alarms. The function 
“Interpret Alarm” is identified again. 
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Name of Function Sound Crew Emergency Alarm 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output Fire Party Mustered 
Evacuate Team Mustered 
Precondition Power Provided 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time Fire Confirmed 
Table 26 Function -  Sound Crew Emergency Alarm 
The Outputs of this function are to have the fire party as well as the evacuate team 
mustered for the needed later functions. The time this function is initiated is depended on the 
time the fire was confirmed and assessed by the already identified “Confirm Fire” function. The 
precondition for this function is to have power provided by the “Provide Power” function 
identified earlier.  
Name of Function Cool Boundaries 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Water Applied to Boundaries 
Output Boundaries Cooled 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 27 Function -  Cool Boundaries 
The Outcome of the function “Cool Boundaries” is to have the boundaries cooled. The 
function is initiated by the input “water applied to boundaries” that is the outcome of the function 
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“Fight Fire Manually” and the water applied via the drenching system. Thus, the function 
“Activate Drenching System” is identified. 
Name of Function Activate Drenching System 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Fire Assessed 
Output Water Applied to Boundaries 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control Water Drained 
Time N/A 
Table 28 Function -  Activate Drenching System 
The Outcome of the function “Activate Drenching System” is to apply water to the 
boundaries. It is also used to apply water directly to the fire but the system is not designed for 
this and ultimately failed, especially due to the time it was initiated. The input that initiates this 
function is to have the fire assessed from the “Confirm Fire” function. The drenching system is 
controlled in accordance to the accumulation of water. The drainage system is required to 
function properly in order to have the water used for fire fighting drained. Thus the function 
“Drain Water” is identified. 
Name of Function Drain Water 
Description The extinguishing agent must be drained due to 
flooding concerns 
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Water Applied to Fire 
Water Applied to Boundaries 
Output Water Drained 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
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Time N/A 
Table 29 Function -  Drain Water 
The fire fighting system must be equipped with adequate drainage capacity in order to 
reduce the risk of flooding from the applied water. The function “Drain Water” is initiated when 
water is applied either to the fire or the boundaries. The Output of the function is to have the 
aforementioned excess water removed.  
Name of Function Supervise From Bridge 
Description To report ashore and request help via distress 
signal if needed 
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Smoke Detected Manually 
Output Lookout Sent 
Tug Boat Requested 
Distress Signal 
Precondition Fire Assessed 
Resource N/A 
Control Report to Bridge 
Time N/A 
Table 30 Function -  Supervise From Bridge 
The Output of the function “Supervise From Bridge” is to send the lookout to confirm 
and assess the fire after the alarms signalling. Another Output is to request a Tug Boat from 
ashore if the vessel is incapable of manoeuvring to shore without assistance. Finally, it has the 
Outcome to send a distress signal. The function’s performance is controlled by the report that 
was sent to the bridge after the alarms were interpreted from the “Interpret Alarm” function. The 
precondition for better performance of this function is to have the fire assessed accurately in 
order to supervise. The function can be initiated without prior alarm if the fire is detected via the 
CCTV the vessel was equipped with. Thus, the function “Supervise via CCTV” is identified. 
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Name of Function Supervise via CCTV 
Description For any compartment that was equipped with 
CCTV 
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output Smoke Detected Manually 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 31 Function -  Supervise via CCTV 
The Outcome of this function is to provide an early detection system with the potential to 
assess the fire at an initial point. This outcome is the Input of the function “Supervise from 
bridge” in order to confirm the fire. 
Name of Function Send Helicopter Aid 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Helicopter Granted Liftoff 
Output Water Applied to Fire 
Precondition Experienced Firefighter Prepared 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 32 Function -  Send Helicopter Aid 
The Outcome of the function “Send Helicopter Aid” is to deploy experienced fire fighters 
on board and assist the fire fighting procedure. In order for this function to be initiated the 
helicopter must be granted permission to intervene. Thus, the function “Report Fire Ashore” is 
necessary. The precondition for this function to deliver on time is to have the fire fighters 
prepared. That state is also achieved via reporting to the authorities ashore. 
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Name of Function Report Fire Ashore 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Fire Confirmed 
Output Experienced Firefighters Prepared 
Helicopter Granted Liftoff 
Tug Boat Sent 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control Distress Signal 
Time N/A 
Table 33 Function -  Report Fire Ashore 
The function is initiated after the fire is confirmed onboard. The Output of the function 
“Report Fire Ashore” is to have the ashore authorities prepare the experienced fire fighters that 
are standing by, and grand the helicopter the permission to intervene. This permission is given by 
the vessel’s master after a distress signal is sent ashore. Thus, the required control from output of 
the function “Supervise from Bridge” is needed. Also, another Output of this function is to send 
the Tug Boat if it is requested by the master. 
Even is the fire was contained the crew must take actions to assemble the passengers and 
ensure their safety. 
Name of Function Assemble Passengers 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input General Alarm Sounded 
Output Passengers Assembled 
Precondition Cabins Evacuated 
Evacuate Team Mustered 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
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Time N/A 
Table 34 Function -  Assemble Passengers 
The function Assemble Passengers is identified. The Outcome of this function is to 
assemble all the passengers to ensure their safety. The function is initiated when the general 
alarm is activated. The preconditions are to have the cabins evacuated and the hotel staff (named 
evacuate team here) mustered. Thus, the functions “Activate General Emergency Alarm” and 
“Check Cabins for Passengers” are identified. 
Name of Function Activate General Emergency Alarm 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output General Alarm Sounded 
Precondition Power Provided 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time Fire Confirmed 
Table 35 Function -  Activate General Emergency Alarm 
The function “Activate General Emergency Alarm” refers to the activation of the alarm 
calling the passenger to muster in the assembly stations. The precondition for the function to be 
effective is to have power provided since power shortages will delay the alarm. The Output of 
the function is to have the general alarm activated. The time the general alarm is activated 
depends on the time the fire is confirmed. 
Name of Function Check Cabins for Passengers 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output Cabins Evacuated 
Precondition Evacuate Team Mustered 
Resource N/A 
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Control General Alarm Sounded 
Time N/A 
Table 36 Function -  Check Cabins for passengers 
The Outcome of this function is to ensure the cabins are evacuated. This function is 
controlled by the activation of the general alarm that signals the evacuate team to check the 
cabins. This constitutes the control of the function. The precondition is to have the evacuate team 
mustered and ready. 
Variability of the functions 
The function “Supervise via CCTV” did not perform as intended. The purpose of the 
function was to observe the vehicle deck for signs of smoke and fire, with regard to this incident. 
The screen became hazy before any alarm sounded but that was no cause for concern. The fire 
could be confirmed earlier if the function performed as imagined but, possibly due to neglect due 
to the increased number of sensors on the bridge, the detection was omitted.  
The function “Interpret Alarm” did not perform as intended. Among others, the purpose 
of this function is to report the alarm to the bridge. The third engineer on watch insisted that 
there was a problem in the electrical circuits that sounded the alarms and bypassed a great 
amount of alarms himself. This internal variability resulted in an initial confusion when the fire 
was on early stages. 
The function “Confirm Fire” did not perform as intended. The lookout sent by the bridge 
confirmed the fire from other crew members who smelled smoke. Even though the fire was 
correctly confirmed the variability of the output “fire assessed” increased because the lookout 
stopped in the restaurant where the other crew members were. This is a case of upstream-
downstream variability of the function since the input varied. Also, the internal variability of the 
function is due to the lack of fire fighting equipment (mask) for the lookout to assess the fire 
earlier. Hence, the fire had more time to develop during those critical initial stages. 
The function “Provide Power” had its performance varied on later stages. At first, the 
function carried out as intended but fire damage lead to power shortages in critical machinery in 
later stages.  
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These power shortages failed to provide power to the bow thrusters that was necessary 
for them to deploy. Hence, the function “Activate Bow Thrusters” had variability due to 
upstream-downstream coupling with the function “Provide Power”. Also, the function had 
internal variability from the fact that a lot of machinery was damaged from the fire. 
The function “Cut Air Supply” had variability due to upstream-downstream coupling 
since even though the ventilation was stopped automatically, the fire screen doors were not 
closed by the fire party and discovered too late, allowing the fire to further develop. 
The “Activate Drenching System” function was initiated by the chief engineer after interpreting 
the alarms. The function varied its performance since the water drains were partially blocked 
demanding continuous breaks on the water drenching system for the water not to be 
accumulated.  
“Drain water” had its performance varied due to internal factors. Fire damage resulted in 
partial blockage of the drains that reduced the system’s capacity to remove excess water. This 
varied output greatly affected the drenching system performance. 
The function “Report Fire Ashore” also had great variability from the expected 
performance. This variability was due to upstream-downstream couplings on the control “distress 
signal”. The function had the experienced fire fighters prepared but the tug boat was given 
permission to tug the vessel later due to no distress signal was issued by the master. The 
helicopter was also not granted permission to begin operation for the same reason.  
The distress signal was not issued by the function “Supervise from Bridge” as intended. 
There was miscommunication as to whether help from ashore was needed or not, but no distress 
signal was issued. The function was also subject to variability because of the insistence of the 
third engineer that there was no fire but false alarms due to electrical damage. 
The function “Fight Fire Manually” had water applied to the fire as an output. This 
output’s variability was increased since the fire hoses were too hot to operate and the party 
retreated with limited effect on the fire. This function’s output “fire doors close” was also late 
but due to upstream-downstream coupling on its precondition “fire assessed” that was too late. 
The function “Maintain List” had great variability due to upstream-downstream coupling 
with the function “Drain Water”. List was created due to the accumulate water from the 
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drenching system. The damage to list was mitigated by opening and closing the drenching 
system in a fashion that allowed water to be removed before more water was applied to the fire. 
The varied output increased the variability in the function “Maintain Course”. 
“Maintain course” Output was to deliver the vessel at port, where fire fighters would 
attack the fire much more efficiently that it was attacked at sea. The function failed to perform as 
intended because of the upstream-downstream variability from the varied outputs that were the 
function’s preconditions. The bow thrusters were not activated because of the power shortage 
discussed above. The list was also not maintained because of the faulty drenching system as also 
discussed earlier. 
“Activate Bow Thrusters” had its performance varied since the technical system 
surrendered to fire damage and power outages. Even though efforts were made to be initiated 
manually the results were negative. 
The goal of delivering the vessel at port was achieved via a tug boat. The function “Tug 
Vessel” performed as intended but was initiated late because of the aforementioned 
miscommunication. The control “Tug boat requested” was too late because the master of the 
vessel did not issue a distress signal. However, the function was successful.  
The function “Send helicopter Aid” varied because of upstream-downstream variability. 
The helicopter had the experienced fire fighter prepared and was ready for lift-off but the master 
did not request the assistance at first, thinking of the fire more of a challenge that could be 
tackled without external help.  
The emergency alarm was activated successfully but relatively late because the fire 
confirmation was late. 
The function “Evacuate Ship” was carried out successfully because of the double input 
that allowed the vessel to be towed when the ship’s seagoing was damaged. 
Function Output Variability of the Output 
Supervise via CCTV Smoke Detected 
Manually 
Detection was omitted. The hazy image of the 
CCTV was not seen by the officer on watch earlier 
than the alarms sounded. 
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Interpret Alarm Report To Bridge The third engineer insisted that the alarms was due 
to minor electrical damage to the electrical circuit 
Confirm Fire Fire Assessed The lookout that was sent by the officer on the 
bridge was unable to enter the vehicle deck 
because he was not equipped with breathing 
apparatus. He later geared up but the fire had 
spread. 
Fire Confirmed Due to miscommunication the fire was confirmed 
late. 
Provide Power Power Provided Electrical damages resulted in power shortages in 
certain machinery 
Cut Air Supply Fire Suffocated The fire screen doors were not closed allowing air 
and smoke to travel to and from the fire 
respectively.  
Activate Drenching 
System 
Water Applied to 
Boundaries 
The performance of the drenching system was 
hindered because of the late activation and the 
need to take breaks for water not to accumulate 
further. 
Drain water Water Drained Water was not drained as intended since the water 
drains were partially blocked. This created the 
need for the drenching system to take breaks for 
water not to accumulate further. 
Report Fire Ashore Tug Boat Sent The distress signal was not issued until the vessels 
manoeuvrability was completely lost. 
Helicopter Granted 
Lift-off 
The helicopter was not requested by the master. 
Supervise from 
Bridge 
Distress Signal The distress Signal was not issued by the master 
of the vessel. This resulted in confusion on 
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whether the master needed assistance from ashore 
or not. 
Fight Fire Manually Water Applied to Fire The fire party was challenged by a fully developed 
fire in a confined space. The hoses were 
too hot to touch and the crew was unable 
to use the equipment. 
Tug Vessel Vessel Arrived at Port The function performed positively but was 
initiated late due to delayed request. 
Send helicopter Aid Water Applied to Fire The helicopter intervention was not requested by 
the master 
Activate Bow 
Thrusters 
Bow Thrusters 
Activated 
The bow thrusters had been damaged by the fire 
and even with manual attempts they could not be 
deployed 
Maintain course Vessel Arrived at Port The vessel could not arrive to port with her own 
means. The rudder had been damaged and the bow 
thrusters were also damaged. 
Maintain List List Maintained The list could not be maintained because excess 
water had accumulated by the drenching system 
because the drainage system was partially 
blocked. Even with attempts to allow the drainage 
system to remove excess water, the need to 
contain the fire had negative effect on the vessel’s 
list. 
Table 37 Variability of the Outputs 
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Graphical Representation 
 
Figure 7 Graphical Representation 1 
Functional Resonance 
Rather than addressing safety issues like the initial investigation report, the FRAM 
attempts to suggest means of improvement regarding the resilience of the system. This thesis will 
attempt to make suggestions that would increase the responsiveness of the socio-technical 
system. 
At first, the existing upstream-downstream couplings will be analysed to identify how the 
variability in a downstream function can increase the variability in downstream functions and 
may ultimately result in functional resonance.  
The function “Evacuate Ship” had both Inputs’ variability increased as well as the control 
function’s. The vessel arrived at port that was necessary to initiate the function but both upstream 
functions that provided this Input had great variability. The function “Maintain Course” ceased 
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to perform and the function “Tug Vessel” was initiated too late. The control function “Contain 
Fire” had increased variability that further delayed the function “Evacuate Ship”.  
The function ultimately performed positively but the functional resonance that combined 
lead to the long delay until the function was performed. 
The function “Tug Vessel” was delayed because the control ‘tug boat requested’ had 
increased variability. The upstream function “Supervise from Bridge” had upstream variability 
since the precondition ‘fire assessed’ was not precise. The ‘fire assessed’ state is the Outcome of 
the “Confirm Fire” function. The “Confirm Fire” function’s Input ‘lookout sent’ and Resource 
‘fire fighting equipment provided’ variability resulted in the lookout not being able to fully 
assess the magnitude of the fire, thus varying the output ‘fire assessed’.  
This hindered the master’s decision making discussed as a non-technical skill in the 
theoretical background. This variability in performance resulted in delayed request of the tug 
vessel. The false assessment led the master to believe that the vessel could reach port on her own 
means.  
The function “Maintain Course” variability of outcome is due to the variability of 
upstream functions “Maintain List” and “Activate Bow Thrusters”. The bow thrusters could not 
be activated due to fire damage to the electrical circuit, hence the variability of the precondition 
‘power provided’. The performance of the function “Maintain List” was also not as intended. 
The function had precondition to have the water drained to avoid free surface effect and uneven 
loading. The upstream function “Drain Water” had increased internal variability as discussed 
earlier and did not perform as it was imagined. This functional resonance resulted in variability 
on the downstream function “Maintain Course” making the function unable to perform at all.  
The function’s “Drain Water” internal variability transferred to the downstream function 
“Activate Drenching System” hindering the latter function’s performance. The function 
“Activate Drenching System” also had the Input’s ‘fire assessed’ varied as discussed above. This 
functional resonance combined making the function unable to perform efficiently and even 
making it had negative outcomes on the aforementioned function “Maintain List”.  
This variability was also transferred to the function “Cool Boundaries” that was not able 
to perform as intended. This resulted in variability of the control of the function “Contain Fire” 
 Page | 71  
 
that combined with the functional resonance from the variability of the functions “Maintain 
Course” and “Tug Vessel” resonate to vary “Evacuate Ship” performance.  
The function “Contain Fire” also had high variability on other Inputs and Preconditions. 
The upstream function’s “Fight Fire Manually”, “Send Helicopter Aid” and “Cut Air Supply” 
were subject to variability of their Outcomes.  
The function “Fight Fire Manually” had variability due to the upstream function’s 
“Sound Crew Emergency Alarm” delay. This delay was in turn due to the delayed fire 
confirmation that was discussed above. This resulted in delayed muster of the fire party even 
though the function itself performed as imagined. The inaccurate assessment of the fire and the 
delays resulted in the crew being unable to use the fire fighting equipment even though it was 
provided. This leads to the variability of the Outcome ‘close fire screen doors’ that was the input 
of the function “Cut Air Supply”.  This variability transferred to the now downstream function 
“Contain Fire” that has the precondition of air deprivation.  
Suggestions for Improvement 
As presented in detail in chapter 3, the system should be managed to reduce the future 
occurrences of similar incidents. The system should also be managed for increased 
responsiveness when such occurrences happen. This can be done by: eliminating the hazards, 
prevention (referring to the addition of dampening barriers), facilitation (meaning the 
strengthening of existing barriers) and protection (reactive damage mitigation). 
Suggestion 1. 
The function “Drain Water” has internal variability as discussed earlier. This variability 
derives from the fact that the drains were partially blocked reducing the available flow of excess 
water. The high density of the vehicles in the vehicle deck reduced the manoeuvrability of the 
fire party. As a result the function “Fight Fire Manually” could also not perform as intended.  
Since the density of the vehicles result in variability in those functions this hazard’s elimination 
could reduce the functional resonance in downstream functions resulting in increased 
performance in function “Contain Fire”. The drop in variability of the function “Fight Fire 
Manually” may potentially influence variable Outcomes such as the variability in ‘close screen 
doors’. The actual and perceived challenge will be easier reducing the stress response of the 
team. 
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Eliminate the hazard created by the high density of the vehicles. Leave ‘paths’ for easy 
access by the fire fighting response team. 
Suggestion 2. 
As seen in the paragraph that described the functional resonance, the upstream functions 
“Confirm Fire” and “Activate Drenching System” are subject to upstream-downstream 
variability. The common variables are the Outputs of the function “Confirm Fire”, ‘fire 
confirmed’ and ‘fire assessed’. The addition of another function of a fire patrol operating such 
hazardous areas is a viable tool, given the number of crew members the vessel accommodates, 
that could increase the responsiveness of the system. This preventive measure provides an 
additional Input for the function “Confirm Fire” and for the function “Activate Drenching 
System” since a fire patrol is much more likely to detect the fire even by smell at early stages, 
where the drenching system would be more effective and the undeveloped clogging of the drains 
would not reduce the “Drain Water” performance. The complete effects are easily derived from 
the upstream-downstream analysis on functional resonance paragraph above. This could increase 
the resilience of the system given that such technical malfunctions happen. 
Adding an additional fire patrol as a preventive measure for controlling fire spread at 
early stages. 
Name of Function Patrol Vehicle Deck 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output Fire Observed 
Automatic Fire Fighting Initiated 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 38 Function -  Patrol Vehicle Deck 
This addition also changes the following function to comply with the model. 
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Name of Function Activate Drenching System 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Fire Assessed 
Automatic Fire Fighting Initiated 
Output Water Applied to Boundaries 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control Water Drained 
Time N/A 
Table 39 Function -  Activate Drenching Systems 
The figure bellow illustrates the socio-technical system in the FRAM software with the 
addition of the new function. 
 
Table 40 Graphical representation 2 
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Suggestion 3.  
Through the analysis the decision making abilities of the crew are seen as inadequate. 
Events such as misinterpreted alarms, neglected alarms that were bypassed and the refuse to 
assistance from ashore, provided by the port’s authorities, accumulated to significant delays for 
assisting procedures. While single function’s delays may not be significant the common factor of 
delayed decision making is responsible for a number of delays. These functions’ variability 
resonates to significant delays on downstream functions.  
Courses on non-technical skills for crew members as a measure to increase 
responsiveness through better decision making and better situational awareness.  
Suggestion 4.  
The added stress in emergency situations may lead to negative results and decreased 
performance. The function “Fight Fire Manually” should produce the Outcome ‘close fire screen 
doors’. However, the demanding task of attacking a fully developed fire induced higher levels of 
stress probably making the team leader neglect this. While the fire party was unable to extinguish 
the fire, the main focus should be on containing the fire until the vessel is at berth. This, as 
shown before, requires the fire to be deprived of air to mitigate the spread. An additional Input to 
the function “Cut Air Supply” should be added to the system. Since fire in the kind of vessel we 
examine are difficult to extinguish and should be mitigated in best efforts, the confirmation of 
the fire should be an input to close the fire screen doors wherever possible. 
Name of Function Cut Air Supply 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Fire Doors Closed 
Fire Assessed 
Output Fire Suffocated 
Precondition Ventilation Stopped 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
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Table 41 Function -  Cut Air Supply 
This addition allows the initiation of the function when the fire is assessed to ensure 
proper procedure.  
The figure bellow illustrates the socio-technical system in the FRAM software with the 
addition of the new function. 
 
Figure 8 Graphical Representation 3 
The socio-technical system with all the suggestions integrated is described by the 
following figure. 
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Figure 9 Graphical Representation 4 
5.2. Case “Edinburgh Castle” 1998 
Description of the Event 
Edinburgh Castle (32353gt) was built in Italy and was UK registered Class 1 passenger 
ship. The boundaries of the main galley, bulkheads, deck, deckhead and doors were A60 class 
and in accordance with the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS 74). 
On 21 August 1998, while the crew prepared breakfast for the passengers, fire was 
reported to bridge from the fire patrol operating the galley. The fire patrol contacted the bridge 
by radio, after an initial attempt to sound the alarm by breaking the glass panel that failed. The 
alarm in the galley was isolated and was covered by additional fire patrols in the area. This was 
common practice and the crew was well informed of the ways of communication in this 
situation. The report states that this made no difference in the latency. After the bridge 
watchkeeper was informed, a Public Address called the assessment party to the galley. The 
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assessment party confirmed the fire in the area of three deep fat fryers and bridge was informed. 
Initial efforts with multiple portable CO2 extinguishers failed. Also, fire blankets and chopping 
boards were used directly in the source of the fire. The interruption of power was prevented 
because the power contactor of one deep fat fryer had been welded close. Immediately after, the 
sprinkler system was initiated. Smoke detectors sounded in the surrounding compartments and 
the ventilation was stopped, with dampers closed. The bridge watchkeeper then reported the 
situation ashore to the DPA. The crew alert signal sounded and instructions for the passengers to 
not take any action were given. The firefighting continued with SCBA sets, one of which was 
reported and later found defective. This party was successful, and the sprinklers were shut down 
shortly after. Minutes later, the fire was reported extinguished. Fire was then reported on the 
ventilation ducting and steam was released combined with portable CO2 extinguishers and 
boundary cooling to finally extinguish the fire. Hose parties and able seamen stood by for about 
four hours from the final report. The ventilation, alarm and sprinklers system’s operation were 
restored four, nine and ten hours respectively after the final report.  
The delayed report of the fire as well as the weaknesses in the control of fire parties, 
particularly when using self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs) were highlighted in the 
MAIB investigation. The investigation also reported that there was lack of accurate data on the 
vessel’s ventilation system and damper arrangements. It was recommended that more 
comprehensive information on this and other aspects of the vessel’s systems are made available 
to ship’s staff before she is considered to comply with the requirement of ISM code. 
Identification of the functions 
With the benefit of hindsight provided by the investigation report the following functions 
were identified. It must be again noted that the function identification process is not linear but, in 
this thesis, best efforts are presented in the most understandable mean possible. 
The identification of the functions focusses on the firefighting procedure, from the 
moment the fire is detected to the time it is extinguished. The system responsiveness is analysed 
thoroughly. 
The function “Extinguish Fire” is identified. The purpose of this function is to extinguish 
the fire and thus, this is considered the Output of the function. The function is initiated when 
extinguishing agent is applied, either manually or automatically directly to the fire. In this 
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instantiation the sprinklers were activated as they were supposed and the function “Fight Fire 
with Sprinklers” is identified. Also, the trained crew members that consisted the fire party 
manually attacked the fire. The function “Fight Fire Manually” is identified. As discussed earlier 
in the theoretical background, for the fire to be extinguished and prevented from spreading, the 
boundaries must be cooled. Thus, the function “Cool Boundaries” is identified. For this function 
to be successfully performed, and not be described as a function that contains fire rather than 
extinguishing, the success must be confirmed. This confirmation describes the control ‘fire 
confirmed extinguished’ and is provided by the function “Confirm Extinguish”. The function 
“Confirm Extinguish” is therefore also identified.  
Name of Function Extinguish Fire 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Extinguishing agent applied 
Output Fire extinguished 
Precondition Boundaries cooled 
Resource N/A 
Control Fire spreads controlled 
Time N/A 
Table 42 Function -  Extinguish Fire 
The function “Cool Boundaries” has Output ‘boundaries cooled’, the necessary 
precondition for the function “Extinguish Fire”. For the function to be initiated, the Input ‘water 
applied to boundaries’ is necessary. However, since the fire in this instantiation migrated through 
the ductings becoming unreachable the boundary cooling efforts were not optimal. The fire 
should be suppressed with steam in the ductings that can possibly prevent further spreads and 
assist boundary cooling. The functions “Fight Fire with Sprinklers” and “Fight Fire Manually” 
are the upstream functions that provide the needed Input. Also, the function “Release Steam in 
Ventilation” is identified. Finally, for the function “Cool Boundaries” to perform as intended, the 
crew must have nearby passengers evacuated from nearby compartments to prevent any harm 
done. The function “Evacuate Restaurant Area” is identified. 
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Name of Function Cool Boundaries 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Water applied to boundaries 
Output Boundaries cooled 
Precondition Suppress mitigation with steam 
Nearby passengers removed 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 43 Function -  Cool Boundaries 
The Output of the function “Release Steam in Ventilation” is to suppress fire spread 
using steam in the ventilation ductings. It’s a technological function that is initiated when smoke 
is detected in the ventilation. The function “Release Steam in Ventilation” is controlled by a 
supervisor who decides on the proper use of the system. Thus, the function “Supervise” is 
identified. Also, the smoke is detected via smoke detectors in accordance with the systems 
capabilities to monitor the fire. The function “Monitor Fire” is identified. 
Name of Function Release Steam in Ventilation 
Description Ineffective. Stopped too late, when there was 
fog 
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Smoke detected in ventilation 
Output Suppress spread with steam 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control Steam release initiated 
Time N/A 
Table 44 Function -  Release Steam in Ventilation 
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The function supervise combines the assessment data and take actions that initiate 
downstream functions. Some of the downstream functions feed data back to the “Supervise” 
function. The function is initiated when the fire is reported via radio. Thus, the function “Detect 
Fire Initiation Manually” is identified. The function can also be initiated by the “Detect Fire 
Initiation Automatically” but since it was common practice for the crew to shut the alarm down 
and operate with fire patrols in the area (a practice considered to be as effective as the automatic 
detection system) it is only referred for a more complete investigation and could be omitted. The 
Outputs of the function “Supervise” are to initiate steam release into ductings if that is necessary, 
to remotely close the ventilation dampers and to make Public Announcement to muster the crew 
and alert of the incident. In order to perform as intended, data is needed as a Resource for 
decision making. The fire assessment data derive from the “Monitor Fire” function that was 
identified earlier and will be discussed later on. 
Name of Function Supervise 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Radio report 
Output Steam release initiated 
Ventilation dampers closed 
Public address initiated 
alarm activated 
Precondition N/A 
Resource Fire assessed 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 45 Function -  Supervise 
The Outcome of the function “Detect Fire Initiation Automatically” is to activate the 
alarm and notify the crew member on watch of the potential fire. This system was shut down 
during operation in the galley and replaced by fire patrols. The official investigation stated that 
this change should make no difference in the detection time and ultimately in the response time. 
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Name of Function Detect Fire Initiation Automatically 
Description Alarm was shut down 
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output Alarm activated 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 46 Function -  Detect Fire Initiation Automatically 
The Outputs of the function “Detect Fire Initiation Manually” are to report the fire 
initiation to the bridge via the portable radio the crew members on watch were equipped with 
during patrolling, to activate the alarm and to observe the fire in order to monitor. Thus, it 
constitutes the upstream function of the function “Monitor Fire” which is initiated when the fire 
is first observed. 
Name of Function Detect Fire Initiation Manually 
Description Additional fire patrols to cover for disabled 
alarm 
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output Radio report 
Alarm activated 
Fire observed 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 47 Function - Detect Fire Initiation Manually 
To fight fire manually, two separate functions have been identified. When the fire is 
observed the fire patrol used portable CO2 extinguisher to fight the fire. After the fire-fighting 
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team was mustered the fire was first attacked by the first aid team followed by the fire party that 
was better prepared. Thus, the function “Fight Fire Manually (First Aid)” and the function “Fight 
Fire Manually (Fire Party)” are identified to increase detail.  
The function “Fight Fire Manually (Fire Party)” is already identified as a provider for the 
necessary input ‘extinguishing agent applied to fire’ that is the Input of the function “Extinguish 
Fire”. Obviously, one Output of this function is ‘extinguishing agent applied to fire’ but also, 
since the function was used for boundary cooling, the ‘water applied to boundaries’ Output is 
identified as was needed earlier. The fire party needed information about the development of the 
fire in order to handle the incident. This precondition ‘fire assessed’ is provided by the “Monitor 
Fire” function that is already identified. Moreover, the fire party required the proper 
extinguishing agent to be provided as a Resource. The function “Provide Extinguishing Agent” is 
identified. 
Name of Function Fight Fire Manually (Fire Party) 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Proceed to fire party 
Output Extinguishing agent applied 
Water applied to boundaries 
Precondition Fire assessed 
Resource Extinguishing agent provided 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 48 Function - Fight Fire Manually (Fire Party) 
The purpose of the function “Fight Fire Manually (First Aid)” is to attack the fire to 
prevent further development until the fire party is prepared. When this function completes, the 
system proceeds to the “Fight Fire Manually (Fire Party)” function for more effective damage 
mitigation and better chances of extinguishing the fire. The observations of the first aid group 
constitute an additional assessment of the magnitude of the fire. Those observations are 
necessary for the fire party to proceed. The function is initiated as soon as the fire party is 
mustered. In this instantiation the fire party was mustered following a Public Address issued by 
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the bridge. Thus, the function “Public Address to muster assessment party” is identified. Also, it 
is necessary for the function to perform as intended to have nearby passengers evacuated to 
prevent any harm done. 
Name of Function Fight Fire Manually (First Aid) 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Fire party mustered 
Output Initial fire assessed 
Proceed to fire party 
Precondition Nearby passengers evacuated 
Resource Provide extinguishing agent 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 49 Function - Fight Fire Manually (First Aid) 
The function “Fight Fire with Sprinklers” was identified earlier in this thesis. The 
function is initiated when the sprinklers are activated. The Input of the function is ‘sprinklers 
activated’. The necessary precondition for this function to perform is to have extinguishing agent 
provided. This Precondition is the Output of the “Provide Extinguishing Agent” function which 
is used as a general precondition where required.  The sprinklers are not designed to extinguish 
the fire, especially when the fire is due to heated oil. Partly, it is used to apply water to the 
boundaries in an effort to cool them down. 
Name of Function Fight Fire with Sprinklers 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Sprinklers activated 
Output Extinguishing agent applied 
Water applied to boundaries 
Precondition Extinguishing agent provided 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
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Time N/A 
Table 50 Function -  Fight Fire with Sprinklers 
The function “Public Address to muster assessment party” is identified earlier in this 
thesis. The public announcement system is initiated when the alarm is sounded by the 
supervisors. Thus, the Input is the state ‘alarm sounded’ and the Control is ‘Public address 
initiated’. The Control state is discussed earlier in the “Supervise” function which has this 
additional Output. In order for the fire party to have clear instructions on which muster station is 
the most efficient, as well as for information on the location of the fire the fire need to be 
assessed at least in a basic level. The Resource ‘fire assessed’ is provided by the “Monitor Fire” 
function that is already identified. The Output of the function is to have the first aid party 
mustered since the fire party initiated the efforts under first aid’s completion. Also, the Output 
‘nearby passengers evacuated’ is provided by this function in addition to the “Evacuate 
Restaurant Area” function that is identified through the analysis in later steps. The function 
“Sound the Alarm” is identified as a necessary function to provide the Input. 
Name of Function Public Address to muster assessment party 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Alarm Sounded 
Output Fire party mustered 
Nearby passengers evacuated 
Precondition N/A 
Resource Fire assessed 
Control Public address initiated 
Time N/A 
Table 51 Function -  Public Address to muster assessment party 
The function “Monitor Fire” purpose is to assess the fire and provide the crew with data 
to efficiently handle the incident. The function also includes the smoke detection sub-function 
which is necessary to provide data to the supervisors and the fire attack party. Given that the 
smoke detector did not malfunction and does not appear to be part of the upstream-downstream 
couplings, it is decided that it will be included in the “Monitor Fire” function. Parts of the 
 Page | 85  
 
aforementioned data come from the assessment of the first aid party and are useful for the fire 
attack party when re-entering. Thus ‘initial fire assessed’ is identified as a Resource for this 
function.  
Name of Function Monitor Fire 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Fire observed 
Output Fire assessed 
Smoke detected in ventilation 
Sprinklers activated 
Precondition N/A 
Resource Initial fire assessed 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 52 Function -  Monitor Fire 
Since the automatic detection system was shut down, the alarm needed to be activated 
manually. In this instantiation the variability of the Output that will be discussed later, creates the 
need for a separate function “Sound the Alarm”. The break-glass alarm was isolated as part of 
the modifications to the fire detection socio-technical system. The function is initiated by the 
activation of the alarm. This activation is inseparable from the fire detection since it is the first 
action that needs to take place. Thus, the function “Detect Fire Initiation Manually” is identified. 
The alarm in the proper functioning socio-technical system should be activated by the automatic 
fire detection system that was shut down in this instantiation. The function “Detect Fire Initiation 
Automatically” is again identified to distinguish this variability in the system during the incident. 
The function can also be initiated by the “Supervision” function that is identified. 
Name of Function Sound the Alarm 
Description The break glass alarm was isolated 
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Alarm activated 
Output Alarm sounded 
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Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 53 Function -  Sound the Alarm 
The function “Provide Extinguishing Agent” was identified via previous functions as a 
general precondition for any function that required an extinguishing agent to be available. Inputs, 
Preconditions, Resources, Control and Time are not identified but it is considered necessary 
under general maintenance to have all the necessary equipment to assist the fire-fighting 
procedure.  
Name of Function Provide Extinguishing Agent and Fire-fighting 
Equipment 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output Extinguishing agent provided 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 54 Function - Provide Extinguishing Agent and FireFighting Equipment 
The function “Confirm Extinguish” is identified in the early stages of the identification 
process. The necessary Input for the function to initiate is to extinguish the fire.  The fire is 
confirmed extinguished but as discovered later on, the fire had minor spreads. This first 
confirmation initiated the function “Confirm Extinguish” that was required to ultimately 
complete the “Extinguish Fire” function without any doubt. This function was carried out by the 
fire party standing by as is required to prevent further spreading. Since the initiation and 
completion of the function is controlled by the fire party, the necessary state ‘situation 
controlled’ is the Control of the now identified function “Fire Party Standby”. To successfully 
confirm the extinguish fire spreads must be controlled. Thus, the necessary Precondition ‘fire 
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spreads controlled’ is provided by the function “Prevent Fire Spread”. The function “Prevent Fire 
Spreads” is identified.  
Name of Function Confirm Extinguish 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Fire extinguished 
Output N/A 
Precondition Fire spreads controlled 
Resource N/A 
Control Situation monitored 
Time N/A 
Table 55 Function -  Confirm Extinguish 
The function “Fire Party Standby” is identified and initiated by the Output of the 
“Extinguish Fire” function ‘fire extinguished’. The purpose of the fire party standing by is to 
monitor the situation and intercept possible re-ignitions in an undeveloped stage. The two 
functions must coexist until the vessel arrives at port and experienced fire fighters take over. 
Moreover, the fire party must also have the necessary fire-fighting equipment that is provided by 
the “Provide Extinguishing Agent” function. 
Name of Function Fire Party Stand by 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Fire extinguished 
Output Situation monitored 
Precondition Extinguishing Agent Provided 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 56 Function -  Fire Party Stand by 
The function “Prevent Fire Spreads” is identified earlier in the identification process. The 
purpose of this function is to take the actions required to prevent the fire from further spreading. 
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This is described by the Output of the function “Prevent Fire Spreads” which is the state ‘fire 
spreads controlled’. For this function to perform as intended, the ventilation dampers must be 
closed to prevent the fire from spreading through the air ductings. This is recognized as a 
Precondition. The Precondition is provided by the function “Supervise” that evaluates the data 
from other functions to decide to close the ventilation dampers. To prevent fire from spreading 
through radiation, the boundaries must be cooled down. This additional Precondition is the state 
‘boundaries cooled’ that is the Output of the “Cool Boundaries” function that was previously 
identified. The fire is also prevented from spreading with the assistance of the vessel’s built in 
steam system that allows steam to be released in the ductings to suppress fire spreading. The 
Resource ‘Suppress spread with steam’ is provided by the “Release Steam in Ventilation’ 
function’s Output and primary purpose. The function “Release Steam in Ventilation” is 
identified previously. The “Prevent Fire Spreads” function’s Output is the state of control 
regarding fire spreading. The Output ‘fire spreads controlled’ is necessary to extinguish the fire 
and therefore are used as Control in the “Extinguish Fire” function.  
Name of Function Prevent Fire Spreads 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output Fire spreads controlled 
Precondition Ventilation dampers closed 
Boundaries cooled 
Resource Suppress spread with steam 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 57 Function -  Prevent Fire Spread 
The function “Evacuate Restaurant Area” is identified.  The Output of this function is the 
state ‘nearby passengers evacuated’. This function continues to perform until the incident is 
resolved and the way the function performs is controlled by the state ‘fire spreads controlled’ 
since it is a necessary requirement for proper evacuation of the areas that are under threat. The 
function is initiated by the fire being observed to calmly evacuate the restaurant and surrounding 
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areas. Thus, the function “Detect Fire Initiation Manually” is required for its necessary Output 
‘fire observed’. 
Name of Function Evacuate Restaurant Area 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Fire observed 
Output Nearby passengers evacuated 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control Fire spreads controlled 
Time N/A 
Table 58 Function -  Evacuate Restaurant Area 
Variability of the functions 
The function “Detect Fire Initiation Manually” had several Outputs.  While the fire was 
detected during the early stages by the fire patrol, thus initiating the function “Monitor Fire” as it 
was imagined to do,  the Output ‘alarm activated’ was initiated later than expected. This is due to 
the isolation of the glass-break alarm as part of the automatic fire detection system that was 
deactivated. The variability on the Output ‘alarm activated’ caused the downstream function 
“Sound the Alarm” to be performed later than it was supposed to.  The fire patrol reported the 
incident via radio and the bridge was ultimately notified.  
The function “Detect Fire Initiation Automatically” had increased variability of the 
Output ‘alarm activated’. The reason for this is the alarm shut-down that was common practice. 
Even though it was common practice it is considered that the socio-technical system involved in 
the fire-fighting efforts was designed to perform with this tool enabled and since it was shut 
down, the function did not perform at all. 
The function “Supervision” was subject to internal variability. While the alarm was 
activated and the master initiated the function “Public Address to Muster Assessment Party” as 
intended, the Output ‘ventilation dampers closed’ was performed too late. This resulted in 
upstream-downstream variability that will be discussed in detail in later paragraphs. 
Additionally, the initiation of the smothering steam system in the ventilation was later than 
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required and that resulted in variability of the Output “steam released initiated”. This delay may 
have caused the steam smothering system’s performance to be sub-optimal.  
The function “Prevent Fire Spreads” did not perform as intended. The necessary 
preconditions were to have the boundaries cooled (that did not result in upstream-downstream 
variability since the function “Cool Boundaries” did perform as intended) and to close the 
ventilation dampers. Since the ventilation dampers were not closed on time, the fire spread in the 
ductings resulting in the function “Prevent Fire Spreads” to not perform precisely. The Resource 
‘supress spread with steam’ was also subject to variability since the smothering system did not 
have the desired performance as discussed earlier. 
The function “Evacuate Restaurant Area” was subject to internal variability of the 
Output. The Output ‘nearby passengers evacuated’ had increased variability since the passengers 
had not be removed by the restaurant staff even though the fire was detected. The needed 
evacuation was provided by the public announcement issued by the bridge but this path created 
undesired stress among the passengers. This variability may not be adequate to produce 
downstream variability in this instantiation but the system’s resilience, meaning the ability to 
cope with this loss of performance in this function, should not be taken for granted.  
The technological function “Fight Fire with Sprinklers” was subject to variability of one 
of the Outcomes. While the sprinklers were activated as intended and used to apply water to the 
boundaries of the restaurant, the application of water directly to the fire resulted in increased 
amounts of steam released, making fire-fighting efforts significantly harder. This possibly 
increased the task the fire-fighting parties encountered increasing their stress levels and reducing 
their performance. In a sense, the function initiated too late, when the temperatures of the room 
were higher and water vapour was immediately produced as water droplets came in contact with 
hot surfaces.  
The function “Sound the Alarm” experienced upstream-downstream variability due to 
variability of the Input ‘alarm activated’. While the alarm was finally activated, the isolation of 
the glass-break alarm was responsible for a minor latency in the initiation of the function. 
The function “Release Steam in Ventilation” did not perform as imagined. The function’s 
purpose is to have steam released in the ventilation ductings to prevent the fire from traveling 
through the air vents and to smother the fire. The smothering system did not manage to prevent 
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the fire from spreading. Also, due to fire on the ventilation itself, the released steam reduced the 
crew’s visibility making fire-fighting efforts less effective. 
The function “Prevent Fire Spreads” had its performance hindered. The precondition 
‘ventilation dampers closed’ was delivered too late and the fire had sufficient time to spread to 
the ventilation system. The dampers were not left open for enough time for the fire to spread 
beyond this compartment but that is a serious hazard that was avoided in this instantiation. 
Additionally, the steam smothering system that was required to provide the needed Resource had 
not been as efficient as presumed.  
The function “Confirm Extinguish” was subject to upstream-downstream variability of 
the Precondition ‘fire spreads controlled’. This Precondition is the Output of the “Prevent Fire 
Spreads” function that was subject to variability as described earlier. This caused the 
confirmation to be too late since continued spreads kept on emerging in this instantiation. While 
the Input ‘fire extinguished’ could not be granted, this did not prevent the function from 
performing as intended. This upstream-downstream coupling will be discussed in detail in the 
functional resonance segment later. It is important to note that this active feedback between the 
two functions ensured the ultimate completion of both. 
The function “Provide Extinguishing Agent and Fire-fighting Equipment” did not 
perform entirely accurately. This internal variability of the Output was because one of the SCBA 
sets malfunctioned but since the fire was developed and impossible to be contained at the 
moment the malfunction occurred, its effects were limited. However, this malfunction may have 
been of importance if it occurred in a different moment.  
The function “Extinguish Fire” did not perform as imagined. The variability of the Input 
‘extinguishing agent applied’ that derived from the function “Fight Fire with Sprinklers” was an 
ineffective Input for the function “Extinguish Fire”. This was covered by the alternative Input of 
the function that was produced by the function “Fight Fire Manually (Fire Party)”. The latter 
function was successful at producing the Outcome but not as effective at the early stages, adding 
latency to the function “Extinguish Fire”. 
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Function Output Variability of the Output 
Detect Fire Initiation 
Manually 
alarm activated The break-glass alarm was isolated and could not 
be used. The attempt to initiate the alarm from the 
break-glass alarm combined with the need for an 
alternative solution to activate the alarm resulted 
in the alarm being activated later than was 
expected in this instantiation. 
Detect Fire Initiation 
Automatically 
alarm activated The automatic fire detection system was 
deactivated as was common practice. The lack of 
this barrier is likely to increase the latency the 
alarm is being activated. Technological systems 
are more reliable than the human element which 
can be more easily distracted. In this instantiation 
this function did not perform at all. 
Supervision ventilation dampers 
closed 
The ventilation dampers should be closed as soon 
as the fire was detected to prevent spreading 
through the ductings and to assist the 
extinguishing process by depriving the fire from 
air.  
Steam released initiated The smothering steam was released too late 
because it was not prioritized and therefore was 
ineffective against a developed fire of this kind. 
The fire had spread to the ductings and the steam 
was not as effective as imagined. 
Prevent Fire Spreads Fire spreads controlled Since the necessary requirement were not met in 
this instantiation, the fire spread in the ductings. It 
is important to note that the location of the fire 
made it easier to spread in hard to reach areas. 
Fight Fire with Extinguishing agent The extinguishing agent that was applied to fire 
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Sprinklers applied was ineffective primarily because of the time it 
was initiated. The Sprinklers are ineffective in a 
fully developed fire regarding the process of 
extinguishing. 
Sound the Alarm Alarm sounded The initiation of the function was later than 
expected since the fire detection system was 
inactive. The variability of this Output is 
considered minor but may be important through 
functional resonance analysis. 
Release Steam in 
Ventilation 
Suppress spread with 
steam 
The function was initiated late and the fire had 
already spread in the ductings in this instantiation. 
This made the smothering system less effective 
against a fire that had spread in the ductings. 
Extinguish Fire Fire extinguished This function did not perform as expected since 
fire spreads continued long after the fire had been 
extinguished in the area of the three deep fat 
fryers. This minor variability of the Output 
increased the risk and the duration of the incident 
significantly. 
Confirm Extinguish Fire confirmed 
extinguished 
The fire could not be confirmed extinguished 
because of continuing ignitions in the ductings. 
Until the fire was extinguished from every 
possible location, the confirmation could not be 
completed. 
Provide Extinguishing 
Agent and Fire-
fighting Equipment 
Extinguishing agent 
and extinguishing 
equipment provided  
One of the SCBA masks failed to provide breathing 
air to a crew member during re-entry. The crew 
member had to retreat in risk of suffocation 
Table 59 Variability of the Outputs 2 
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Graphical Representation 
 
Figure 10 Graphical Representation 5 
Functional Resonance 
 
Rather than addressing safety issues like the initial investigation report, the FRAM 
attempts to suggest means of improvement regarding the resilience of the system. This thesis will 
attempt to make suggestions that would increase the responsiveness of the socio-technical 
system. 
At first, the existing upstream-downstream couplings will be analysed to identify how the 
variability in a downstream function can increase the variability in downstream functions and 
may ultimately result in functional resonance.  
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The function’s “Detect Fire Initiation Manually” performance varied the output ‘alarm 
activated’ causing the function “Sound the Alarm” to be initiated later than expected. This 
upstream-downstream variability of the Output combined with the variability of the Output 
‘public address initiated’ that was performed late by the “Supervision” function resonated to 
increased latency of the function “Public Address to muster Assessment Party”. Even though the 
variability on the Output of the two functions that provided the Input and the Control for the 
function “Public Address to Muster the Assessment Party” was minor and the respected latency 
was low, the functional resonance analysis explains the delayed initiation of the latter function. 
Of course this is not to suggest that the function failed or the response was insufficient but only 
to point out the reasons it was not optimal. 
The upstream-downstream variability of the Output ‘extinguishing agent applied to fire’ 
resulted in variability of the Input of the function “Extinguish Fire” as a result of the sprinklers 
not outputting the imagined performance. Moreover, the variability of the Output of the function 
“Supervise” caused via upstream-downstream variability of the Precondition ‘ventilation 
dampers closed’ resulted in the function “Prevent Fire Spreads” to not function efficiently. This 
caused the socio-technical system to be ineffective in preventive the fire spreads, which was also 
a Control for the function “Extinguish Fire”. Also, the malfunction of the SCBA set that caused a 
crew member to retreat increased the upstream-downstream variability of the function “Fight 
Fire Manually (Fire Party)” that increased the variability of the Output ‘extinguishing agent 
applied’. This functional resonance of the aforementioned three functions significantly increased 
the variability of the function “Extinguish Fire” causing greater variability of the Outcome ‘fire 
extinguished’. This illustrates how minor sources of variability of lesser magnitude can resonate 
to increase the variability significantly on downstream functions. 
The function “Cool Boundaries” in this instantiation had increased variability of the Input 
‘water applied to boundaries’ by the inefficiency of the sprinklers system described in the “Fight 
Fire with Sprinklers” function. It is important to note that the function “Cool Boundaries” 
appears to have dampening effects on the disturbances having the advantage of two separate 
Inputs from two separate functions. The variability from functional resonance in this situation 
was mitigated by this effect. 
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It is important to note that even the function “Prevent Fire Spreads” was subject to 
variability through functional resonance. The variability of the Output ‘ventilation dampers 
closed’ of the function “Supervise” resonated with the internal variability of the Output ‘suppress 
spread with steam’ of the function “Release Steam in Ventilation”. This functional resonance 
increased the variability of the Output of the function “Prevent Fire Spreads” that resonated with 
the variability of the functions “Supervise” and “Fight Fire Manually (Fire Party)” to 
significantly increase the variability of the function “Extinguish Fire” that was described earlier. 
One of the functions that resonated and increased the variability of the function 
“Extinguish Fire” is the variability of the Output ‘extinguishing agent applied to fire’ provided 
by the function “Fight Fire Manually”. This function was also subject to variability through 
functional resonance since both the Input was delivered later than optimal the Resource included 
the SCBA set malfunction that has been described. This functional resonance combined and 
increased the variability of the function’s “Fight Fire Manually” Outcome. This variability of the 
Output resonates with the variability from the aforementioned functions. 
The last identified coupling in this instantiation is the functional resonance that resulted 
by the variability of the Outputs of the “Extinguish Fire” and “Prevent Fire Spreads” functions. 
This functional resonance resulted in imprecise performance of the “Confirm Extinguish” 
function. The fire was not under control because of the continued re-ignitions. This resulted in 
increased time to complete the function “Confirm Extinguish” since the alternating variability of 
the Input and Precondition of the function (‘fire extinguished’ and ‘fire spreads controlled’ 
respectively) significantly increased the variability of this function. 
Suggestions for Improvement  
As presented in detail in chapter 3, the system should be managed to reduce the future 
occurrences of similar incidents. The system should also be managed for increased 
responsiveness when such occurrences happen. This can be done by: eliminating the hazards, 
prevention (referring to the addition of dampening barriers), facilitation (meaning the 
strengthening of existing barriers) and protection (reactive damage mitigation). 
Suggestion 1. 
A hazard that emerged through the investigation of this incident was the distressed 
evacuation of nearby passengers. This was caused because the passengers were alerted via the 
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Public Announcement. It must be taken into account that the passengers do not have the same 
capabilities as trained crew members do, including, but not limited, to situational awareness and 
the detailed understanding of the vessel’s structure. Nearby passengers could be alerted as soon 
as the fire was observed to ensure reduced stress levels that may result in evacuating in a calm 
manner. The public announcement is not a bad practice but, given the opportunity, the socio-
technical system can respond more effectively by managing the nearby passengers earlier. It is 
suggested that an additional function should be included in the socio-technical system to assist 
the evacuation process. From a systemic perspective, functional resonance could be mitigated if 
the Precondition ‘nearby passengers evacuated’ of the functions “Fight Fire Manually (First 
Aid)” and “Cool Boundaries” has an additional function to be provided by. The suggested 
function is identified as “Evacuate Restaurant Area”. This is a preventive measure to add a 
dampening barrier to the socio-technical system. 
The function “Evacuate Restaurant Area” is initiated when the Input ‘fire observed’ is 
met. This Input is provided by the “Detect Fire Initiation Manually” function. The Control of the 
function is ‘fire spreads controlled’ since the procedure for the evacuation depends on the 
availability of safe passages for the passengers. The Output of the function is to have the nearby 
passenger evacuated, same as one Output of the “Public Address to Muster Assessment Party”. 
Name of Function Evacuate Restaurant Area 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Fire observed 
Output Nearby passengers evacuated (same as “Public 
Address to Muster Assessment Party” function’s 
Output) 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control Fire spreads controlled 
Time N/A 
Table 60 Function -  Evacuate Restaurant Area 
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Figure 11 Graphical Respresentation 6 
The figure bellow illustrates the socio-technical system in the FRAM software with the addition 
of the new function. 
 
No additional functions need to be modified since the introduced function produces and 
requires existing Input, Control and Output. 
 
Suggestion 2. 
One method of improving the efficiency of the system is through facilitation. Facilitation 
refers to the strengthening of existing functions in contrast with the addition of new functions. 
The official investigation revealed that the crew did not have the information about the 
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construction of the ventilation system. This in fact, reduced the performance of the “Prevent Fire 
Spreads” function because the precondition ‘ventilation dampers closed’ was not fulfilled. The 
delay in the responsiveness regarding that matter is attributed to the fact that the crew had limited 
knowledge regarding the location of the dampers. Even after the incident, the information was 
unavailable. This is an example of an organizational error that resulted in decreased 
responsiveness during this incident. The method of hazard elimination from this systemic 
perspective suggests that the “Supervise” function was overloaded to produce Outputs, since 
alarm activation, stream release initiation and public address initiation are also additional 
Outputs. The replacement of the system with an automatic system that is integrated to the fire 
detection system and does not require the human factor to interfere should be considered. This 
method of facilitation strengthens this barrier since technological functions are more reliable than 
the human element. Should cost be a limiting factor, the responsible organization should revisit 
the dampers plans and educate the crew members about the existing locations. 
Suggestion 3. 
During the fire-fighting efforts one crew member, part of the fire party, experienced 
discomfort when using an SCBA set. The SCBA set was later examined and found 
malfunctioning. This removes any doubt of the effects that acute stress could have on this 
individual’s performance. No explanation was given regarding this malfunction. However, it is 
suggested that general maintenance should be prioritized and updated evaluations of the 
equipment should be frequent enough to proactively prevent this hazard. The emphasis on 
maintenance in a way constitutes the elimination of the hazard the malfunctioning SCBA set 
introduced to the function’s performance. Even though it was not clear from the initial 
identification that “Maintain” should be included as a function, the functional resonance analysis 
suggests that general preconditions similar to this one could be included in every investigation to 
facilitate positive outcomes. The addition of every possible general precondition for each 
instantiation is beyond the analysis of this thesis. The addition of a general precondition as a 
function named “Maintain” could widen the scope of the investigation even further. 
The function “Maintain” is identified as a general precondition to be included in the 
horizon of the socio-technical system. The function’s purpose is to ensure the performance 
expected by the technological equipment use. In this instantiation, the variability lies in the 
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“Provide Extinguishing Agent” function. Therefore, the precondition ‘proper function of 
equipment’ will be added to the function “Provide Extinguishing Agent”. This will be provided 
as an Output of the function “Maintain”. Since it is important to maintain the necessary 
information in the model without unnecessary additions and since a general precondition is being 
identified, there is no need for Input, Preconditions, Control, Time and Resource. This is an 
organizational function. 
Name of Function Maintain 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output Proper function of equipment 
Precondition N/A 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 61 Function -  Maintain (Maintenance) 
The addition of this Output as a Precondition for the function “Provide Extinguishing 
Agent” requires a new description for this function. 
Name of Function Provide Extinguishing Agent and Fire-fighting 
Equipment 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input N/A 
Output Extinguishing agent provided 
Precondition Proper function of equipment 
Resource N/A 
Control N/A 
Time N/A 
Table 62 Function - Provide Extinguishing Agent and Fire Fighting Equipment 
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The figure bellow illustrates the socio-technical system in the FRAM software with the 
addition of the new function 
 
Figure 12 Graphical Representation 7 
Suggestion 4. 
The aim of functional resonance is to increase the resilience of a system, making it more 
tolerable to disturbances. The variability targeted by this suggestion is the upstream-downstream 
variability of the Output ‘fire confirmed extinguished’ of the function “Confirm Extinguish” that 
is provided as a Control for the function “Extinguish Fire”.  
The addition of a protective function to assist the socio-technical system that focuses on 
the better communication of the crew members is suggested. This function’s purpose is to assist 
the “Prevent Fire Spreads” function by offering better communication regarding the possible 
locations the fire had spread. Since the fire was in the area of three deep fat fryers in this 
 Page | 102  
 
instantiation and the ducting was open above the location of the fire the possibility the fire would 
spread through the ductings was high. A function that accumulates collective the data from the 
fire assessment reports, from the initial to the on-going to provide accurate data to assist the fire 
party and the fire confirmation process is suggested. The function “Communicate” is identified 
as the needed function, referring to the communication needed between the separated crew 
members that investigate for fire spreads. The function “Communicate” is initiated when the 
Input ‘public address initiated’ is provided. The needed Resources for this function to perform as 
intended are the initial fire assessment and the fire assessment provided by the fire party. The 
Resources are provided by the functions “Fight Fire Manually (First Aid)” and “Monitor Fire” 
respectively. The function “Communicate”, in this sense, is directly controlled by the function 
“Confirm Extinguish”. The time the function stops performing is determined by the Output ‘fire 
spreads controlled’. 
Name of Function Communicate 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Public address initiated 
Output Evaluated data provided 
Precondition N/A 
Resource Fire assessed 
Initial fire assessed 
Control Fire confirmed extinguished 
Time Fire spreads controlled 
Table 63 Function -  Communicate 
Changes should also be made in the identification of the “Fight Fire Manually (Fire 
Party)” and “Confirm Extinguish” functions. 
The “Fight Fire Manually (Fire Party)” function’s Control is the new provided state 
‘evaluated data provided’ since the data partially control the fire party’s performance. 
Name of Function Fight Fire Manually (Fire Party) 
Description  
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Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Proceed to fire party 
Output Extinguishing agent applied 
Water applied to boundaries 
Precondition Fire assessed 
Resource Extinguishing agent provided 
Control Evaluated data provided 
Time N/A 
Table 64 Function -  Fight Fire Manually (Fire Party) 
The evaluated data provide a necessary Resource for the function “Confirm Extinguish” 
that is needed for the function to perform more effectively. 
Name of Function Confirm Extinguish 
Description  
Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Fire extinguished 
Output N/A 
Precondition Fire spreads controlled 
Resource Evaluated data provided 
Control Situation monitored 
Time N/A 
Table 65 Function -  Confirm Extinguish 
The figure bellow illustrates the socio-technical system in the FRAM software with the 
addition of the new function 
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Figure 13 Graphical Representation 8 
The socio-technical system with all the suggestions integrated is described by the following 
figure. 
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Figure 14 Graphical Representation 8 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Learning from the past. A lesson can be learned from almost anything that occurs to us in our 
lives. Workplace incidents that result in near misses, property loss, or injuries are no different. 
Our past experiences can prepare us for future challenges. Incidents that have already occurred 
can provide a valuable lesson to learn, regardless of what went wrong. However, these lessons 
must be interpreted fully and completely in order to maximize their potential contribution to 
safety management in the future. By addressing -solely- the obvious causes, the investigator may 
lockstep the solutions he or she provides.  
The shipping industry. The shipping industry realizes this fact and is increasingly investing in 
safety management to protect all valuable assets, be it human lives or the vessel herself. This 
requires deeper understanding of human limitations, such as stress and fatigue and system 
resilience both to reduce the frequency of incidents and to improve the emergency response, thus 
mitigating the damage, when disaster strikes. Many companies spend a lot of time, money, and 
effort to collect information regarding these types of incidents in order to find the root cause and 
try to prevent a similar event from occurring again. 
International focus. These actions are not only funded by the private sector but also by global 
or national organizations as it ensures reduced risk in maritime operations. Their scope is to 
develop new and innovative tools, models and data for increased safety in shipping, respecting 
the harsh conditions and dangerous environment the industry involves. Through these actions, 
many lives have already been saved, as well as expensive assets that would have been otherwise 
lost. 
State-of-the-Art. FRAM proposes a tool that has been proven valuable across different 
industries, as are the aviation industry, offshore drilling industry and others. In Chapter 4- State 
of the Art- of this thesis, there are several instances that prove this value. The same holds true for 
the application on incident investigation on fire accidents onboard ships, as of this study. FRAM 
has already been demonstrated in the shipping sector in certain instances other than emergency 
response onboard ship. 
Different perspective. Incident investigation from a FRAM perspective does not look for a 
cause to be initiated but tries to understand what should have gone right. Then, the investigator 
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analyzes the variability of each function and suggests the causes based on this analysis. It is 
possible to make suggestions on this analysis alone or even suggest additions to the system that 
may reduce future incidents. This can provide out-of-the-box solutions to increase the overall 
resilience of the system.  
Applications. In this study, FRAM was attempted on two separate cases of well-known marine 
incidents involving fire onboard ship, in order to analyze the emergency response of the system. 
This involved a detailed understanding of how the incident occurred and of the events that took 
place. The required information was derived by MAIB, as a reliable source at no cost. 
  
Figure 15 - Process of the Study 
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On Approach. Each event was individually analysed as two completely different case studies. 
First, the events were selected amongst hundreds of past incidents and handpicked based on 1) 
the level of detail of the available data and 2) the sequence of events that occurred. The first 
criterion was applied as most data through the research were incomplete for such and analysis, 
and the latter in order to demonstrate the capabilities of the method in greater detail. 
This initial approach was proven valuable in later stages of the research, as the descriptions were 
complete, and the suggestions provided were more realistic to each situation. However, as with 
any suggestions in hindsight, the validation of the proposed solutions cannot be evaluated, 
especially in dynamic emergency response scenarios.  
 
Figure 16 - Presentation of Methodology 
For each incident, the functions that constructed each instantiation were identified according to 
the history of each event. Then, the functions were linked through their interdependencies and 
the instantiation was developed. This procedure was significantly more time consuming than 
other mainstream methods as fault-tree analysis. However, this effort could be reduced with the 
development of a single database involving frequently encountered functions. Even if every 
emergency response tells a different story with different events taking place, some functions are 
similar in most cases. A ready-to-use solution in such cases would be useful to the researchers 
performing this method. 
Following the identification of the functions and couplings, the variability of each function was 
analysed. This was found the biggest comparative advantage, since it was observed that even 
functions with relatively small variability could greatly affect the outcome of a later function via 
functional resonance. These instances could be overlooked when analyzed with different 
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methods other than FRAM, since they are the result of the interactions between two or more 
functions – something that commonly used methods do not take into account as does FRAM. 
Finally, the instantiations were graphically generated. This was done using the available FRAM 
software tool. The software is user-friendly and provides useful, albeit limited, tools for the user. 
An order can be assigned to the functions to accurately depict the sequence of the events. 
However, this was only for visualization purposes as it provides no additional information.  
Following this analysis, suggestions were provided based on the results. The suggestions were 
based on the principle of increasing the overall resilience of the system, described in Chapter 
2.1.3 of this thesis. Four total suggestions were proposed for each of the two incidents – one for 
each way proposed in the literature (i.e. Elimination, Prevention, Facilitation and Protection).  
The suggestions were then translated into added or altered actions and merged to the 
instantiation. For this, the instantiations need to be created from the initial stages, as each one 
depicts a different instance of the system. At the end of each case, an instantiation of what the 
system would look like with all the suggestions integrated is presented. 
On FRAM. As any other method, applying FRAM has a learning curve. Currently, there are 
limited lectures given on the FRAM, limiting the potential to spread as an innovative method. 
After prolonged use of the tool, graphical representations become more easily understandable 
and thus, the efficacy of using the method increases. 
The FRAM has the intrinsic feature of flexibility, since it is developed to depict different systems 
in different situations from different domains. This flexibility allows the researcher to stop at any 
level of details he or she is adequate for each analysis. During this study, the level of detail in the 
two cases was higher than needed for demonstration purposes. 
The FRAM software offers a visualization tool for better understanding of the instantiation. 
However, providing an overly complicated visualization may hinder its purpose, since it can be 
quite hard to supervise something overly complicated. Thus, many important aspects may be 
overlooked, as are the interactions and the emerging properties. The visualization of systemic 
functional dependencies should provide a clear understanding of the system and FRAM provided 
a solid visualization tool with short learning curve. 
 
The results of the analysis greatly depend on the researcher, as FRAM is a qualitative method. 
The lack of quantifiable results is not considered a shortcoming -as the purpose is to investigate 
the potential couplings- but may be a necessary step for the future of the method. This is 
described in the literature, as attempts to quantify the FRAM have been made, some of which 
with great success, hinting the demand. However, this needs to be demonstrated systemically 
since, until now, quantification is not integrated in the existing software (as of the course of this 
study). 
A FRAM analysis is different from a risk assessment. FRAM is based on modelling the potential 
functionality instead of a specific representation. Thus, rather than analyse an assumed event 
path and look for the probability that single steps may fail or malfunction, a functional analysis 
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tries to find the ways in which a situation can develop, and what the possible outcomes may be. 
Thus, the two methods cannot directly be compared but rather used complimentary to each other, 
as a complete set of solutions for the incident investigator. 
On results. This study analyses the application of the FRAM in emergency response during fire 
incidents on board. The input data was derived from MAIB, which had already done a formal 
investigation of the event. The initial investigation did not apply the FRAM to provide the 
suggestions and did not take largely into account the emergency response. However, the 
sequence of events list was a valuable asset since it provided a clear picture of the event as 
happened. 
The suggestions (1,2,3, and 4 for each case) were derived solely from the FRAM models. 
Collectively, they overlap with the suggestions made by the investigators, with some of the 
additions that are unique in the FRAM. The suggestions are discussed in detailed on the relevant 
Chapter (Chapter 5.1 and 5.2 – Suggestions for Improvement) 
Table 66 - Commodore Clipper, differences in suggestions provided by the formal MAIB investigation and the 
FRAM analysis 
MAIB Investigation FRAM Analysis 
Eliminate the hazard created by the high 
density of the vehicles. Leave ‘paths’ for easy 
access by the firefighting response team 
Eliminate the hazard created by the high 
density of the vehicles. Leave ‘paths’ for easy 
access by the firefighting response team. 
Courses on non-technical skills for crew 
members as a measure to increase 
responsiveness through better decision making 
and better situational awareness. 
Courses on non-technical skills for crew 
members as a measure to increase 
responsiveness through better decision making 
and better situational awareness. 
 Adding an additional fire patrol as a preventive 
measure for controlling fire spread at early 
stages. 
 An additional Input to the function “Cut Air 
Supply” should be added to the system for 
redundancy reasons. 
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Table 67 - Edinburg Castle, differences in suggestions provided by the formal MAIB investigation and the FRAM 
analysis 
MAIB Investigation FRAM Analysis 
Nearby passengers need to be evacuated before 
the firefighting process begins. The crew must 
ensure early evacuation of the area. 
Nearby passengers need to be evacuated before 
the firefighting process begins. The crew must 
ensure early evacuation of the area. 
Proper maintenance of the firefighting 
equipment. 
Proper maintenance of the firefighting 
equipment. 
 Replacement of the damper system with an 
automatic system that is integrated to the fire 
detection system and does not require the 
human factor to interfere should be considered 
 The FRAM highlights the need for better 
Communication between the crew members. 
This is clearly depicted on the FRAM 
graphical representation and on the FRAM 
model. Better communication could dampen 
the effects of other neglected aspects of the 
procedure. 
 
During the FRAM analysis, the initial suggestions were not considered, to reduce researcher 
bias. However, the MAIB report may have been structured in a way that made the suggestions 
more obvious, but this could not have been avoided. 
The recommendations overlap with the tried and tested methodologies applied by formal and 
experienced investigators. Additional recommendations were made which cannot be evaluated 
properly until tested in real-life conditions. This evaluation goes beyond the scope of this study. 
Thus, there are indications that the Functional Resonance Analysis Method can be used for 
obtaining additional lessons learned from past incidents and provide solid suggestions for future 
improvement and better safety management. However, this needs to be further demonstrated in 
larger scale and additional supportive tools and databases need to be developed to increase the 
efficacy and competitiveness of the method. 
The additional recommendations may increase the system’s resilience to an even greater extend 
than the initial investigation. 
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7. Suggestions for future research 
 
Quantification. Through the study and in the existing literature, the need for quantification of 
the FRAM is dormant. Still, the method is applied beyond the academic circles and in multiple 
disciplines. This quantification effort may be even more difficult in the dynamic scenarios of 
emergency response and damage mitigation but could prove a valuable tool for more resilient 
systems. This should be attempted in accordance to the existing efforts of quantification of the 
FRAM in the shipping industry. 
Large scale applications. Application of the FRAM in a large number of new or past incidents 
could improve the reliability of the method. In this study, two separate cases were analysed. This 
may provide indications that the method is valuable for evaluating the emergency response and 
increasing the resilience of a system, but more studies need to be conducted to prove the 
efficiency of the method. This requires large scale applications across different types of vessels 
and in different conditions, as well as a multiple of damage scenarios, as flooding or fire on 
special materials (flammable, etc). 
Collective Databases. Although each instantiation may be different, since it depicts a different 
condition of the system, ship operations and emergency responses share commonly used 
functions. A collective database, preferably embedded on the existing software, could be 
timesaving and would increase the ease of use and thus, the efficacy of the method. 
Machine Learning. Emerging and innovative technologies as Computer Science has recently 
proved a valuable tool for identifying links between different types of datasets. Machine learning 
algorithms could be developed to identify the potential couplings and reduce the risk of 
overlooking the overly complicated socio-technical systems. 
Integration with other systems. Future research could attempt to integrate the FRAM with fire 
and flooding simulation software. This could possibly facilitate the qualification efforts since it 
will provide deterministic data on the Inputs, Outputs, Preconditions, Time, Resource, Controls, 
regarding the technological functions of the instantiations. Functions as “Sound the Alarm” and 
“Fire Sprinklers Turned on” could be coupled with an expected result and make the visualization 
clearer and more accurate. 
 
  
 Page | 113  
 
8. References  
 
• Ahmad Bahoo Toroody, Mohammad Mahdi Abaiee, Reza Gholamnia, Mohammad 
Bahoo Torody, Nastaran Hekmat Nejad, (2016) Developing a Risk-Based Approach for 
Optimizing Human Reliability Assessment in an Offshore Operation 
• Amalberti, R. (2001). The paradoxes of almost totally safe transportation systems. Safety 
Science 
• Carayon P1, Wetterneck TB, Rivera-Rodriguez AJ, Hundt AS, Hoonakker P, Holden R, 
Gurses AP., (2015) Human factors systems approach to healthcare quality and patient 
safety. 
• Dekker, S. (2004). Why we need new incident models. Journal of Human Factors and 
Aerospace Safety 
• Department of Transport. (1987). MV Herald of Free Enterprise. Report for Court No. 
8074 Formal Investigation. 
• Erik Hollnagel (2013) An application of the Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
(FRAM) to Risk Assessment of Organizational Change   
• Erik Hollnagel, (2004) FRAM: The Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
• Erik Hollnagel, David D Woods, Nancy Leveson (2006) Resilience Engineering : 
Concepts and Precepts 
• European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL), (2009) A 
White paper on resilience engineering for ATM 
• Garri G. (1992) Fire on board ship. In: Masellis M., Gunn S. (eds) The Management 
of Mass Burn Casualties and Fire Disasters. Springer, Dordrecht 
• Gesa Praetorius, Monica Lundh ET Margareta Lützhöft, (2017) Learning From The Past 
For Pro-activity – A Re-analysis Of the Incident of the MV Herald of Free Enterprise 
• Gordon, R. P. E. The contribution of human factors to incidents in the offshore oil 
industry. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 61(1998)1, pp. 95-108. 
• Herrera, I. A., & Woltjer, R. (2010). Comparing a multi-linear (STEP) and systemic 
(FRAM) method for incident investigation. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 
(RESS), 95(12), 1269-1275. 
 Page | 114  
 
• Holden, R. J. (2009). People or Systems? To blame is human. The fix is to engineer. 
Professional Safety (December 2009), 34-41. 
• Hollnagel, E. (1998). Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method CREAM. Oxford, 
UK: Elsevier. 
• Hollnagel, E. (2004). Barriers and Incident Prevention. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. 
• IMO. (2010). Development of the ISM Code. Retrieved 2011-02-10, 2011. 
• International Shipping Federation (2011), Manila Amendments to the STCW Convention: 
A Quick Guide for Seafarers 
• Jens Εhman, (2013) Analysis of interdependencies within the firefighting function on an 
off shore platform 
• Leveson, N., Dulac, N., Marais, K., & Carroll, J. (2009). Moving Beyond Normal 
Incidents and High Reliability Organizations: A Systems Approach to Safety in Complex 
Systems. Organization Studies, 30(02 & 03), 227-249. 
• Limao Zhang, Xianguo Wu, Lieyun Ding, Miroslaw J. Skibniewski, Y.Yan, (2012) 
Decision support analysis for safety control in complex project environment based on 
Bayesian Networks. 
• Luigi Macchi, Erik Hollnagel and Jorg Leonhard, (2016) Resilience Engineering 
Approach to Safety Assessment: An Application of FRAM for the MSAW system 
• Lundberg, J., Rollenhagen, C., & Hollnagel, E. (2009). What-You-Look-For-Is-What-
You-Find – The consequences of underlying incident models in eight incident 
investigation manuals. Safety Science, 47, 1297-1311. 
• M.Pielick, Slovenia Control Ltd., Zgornji Brnik, Slovenia & prof.M.Mraz, PhD, Faculty 
of Computer and Information Science University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, (2016) 
Automation of the FRAM method for the purpose of hazard analysis  
• Majdara, A. and T. Wakabayashi, (2009) Component-Based Modeling of Systems for 
Automated Fault Tree Generation. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 
• Matsidi Vasiliki, Papaleonida Paraskevi, (2014) Human Error and Maritime Safety 
• Mitropoulos, Cupido, (2009): The role of production and teamwork practices in 
construction safety: a cognitive model and an empirical case study. 
 Page | 115  
 
• Nancy Leveson, Nicolas Dulac, Karen Marais, and John Carroll, (2009) Moving Beyond 
Normal Incidents and High Reliability Organizations: A Systems Approach to Safety in 
Complex Systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
• Oedewald P., Macchi L., Axelsson C., Eirtheim M.H.R., (2012) Intermediate report of 
MoReMO. Modeling Resilience for Maintenance and Outage 
• Official Investigation Reports from Marine Incident Investigation Branch 
www.gov.uk/maib-reports 
• Q. Yang & J. Tian, (2015) Model-Based Safety Assessment using FRAM for complex 
systems  
• Qibo Yang, Jin Tian, Tingdi Zhao, 2017 Safety is an emergent property: Illustrating 
functional resonance in Air Traffic Management with formal verification  
• Riccardo Patriarca, Giulio Di Gravio, Francesco Constantino, (2016) A Monte Carlo 
evolution of the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) to assess performance 
variability in complex systems. 
• Riccardo Patriarca, Giulio Di Gravio, Francesco Constantino, (2016) A Monte Carlo 
evolution of the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) to assess performance 
variability in complex systems 
• Rogier Woltjer, (2017) Resilience Assessment Based on Models of Functional Resonance 
• Rollenhagen, C. (1995). MTO -en introduktion. Samband Människa, Teknik och 
Organisation. Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
• Rollenhagen, C., Westerlund, J., Lundberg, J., & Hollnagel, E. (2010). The context and 
habits of incident investigation practices: A study of 108 Swedish investigators. Safety 
Science, 28. 
• Schröder-Hinrichs, J-U. (2010). Human and Organizational Factors in the Maritime 
World-Are We Keeping up to Speed. WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs, 9(1), 1-3. 
• Schröder-Hinrichs, J-U., Baldauf, M., Ghirxi, K.T. (2011). Incident investigation 
reporting deficiencies related to organizational factors in machinery space fires and 
explosions. Incident; Analysis and Prevention 43(3) 
• SOLAS, regulation 2 of chapter II-2 
• Stoop, Dekker S., (2010) Incident modeling: from symptom to system 
• Stoop, J., & Dekker, S. (2009). Incident modelling: from symptom to system.  
 Page | 116  
 
• Trafford, S. M. (2009). Maritime Safety. The Human Factors. Sussex: Book Guild 
Publishing. 
• Ventikos N., Lykos G., Rammos A., Petropoulos V., (2018) Have we ever followed the 
procedures on Fire incidents on the maritime environment? An analysis on human 
behavior under stressful conditions. 
• Woltjer, R., & Hollnagel, E. (2008). Functional modelling for risk assessment of 
automation in a changing air traffic management environment. 
• www.sipownersclub.com,  Fire prevention on board ships, 15 May 2015 
 
